Coltan, Goma & my mobile

Here is a link to a BBC article I published today about why Goma matters.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20415534

Photos from a visit there in September 2012.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20415534

Energy politics in eastern DRC

Note the portraits of the three
presidents in the power station's control room

Information in the recently leaked UN report about about Rwanda & Uganda supporting the M23 rebellion in North Kivu does not come as a surprize.

The day Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame refused to publically shake hands at the UN meeting in New York late September, I was visiting the Ruzizi II hydroelectric plant in South Kivu, an hour’s drive from Bukavu.

The Ruzizi II power station, built in 1989, is operated by a tri-national company (Burundi, Rwanda and Congo) but the dam, power station and transformers are located in the DRC.

One third of the electricity, is for Congo, one third for Burundi and another third for Rwanda. Pressumambly, if Kinshasa decided to throw the switch, it could deprive its troublesome neighbours of power.

According to most expert reports, only 9% of Congolese have access to electricity (with 30% in urban areas). But given the frequent blackout spells (délestage) there is never 9% that has electricity at any given moment.

In addition to being a social and economic problem lack of electricity is an environmental catastrophe. People chop down Congo’s forests to produce cooking fuel.

The question that was on the tongues of many Kivutians who know that Congolese electricity is going to Rwanda and who have only limited accesss to electricity themselves is this: if our president is really at odds with Kagame, why are we still supplying Rwanda with our much needed energy?
Does anyone have an anwser to this?

5,000 limos for the Francophonie VIPs

François Hollande’s election to the French presidency cast some doubts about whether the Sommet de la Francophonie would be maintained in Kinshasa – and if so, would the Socialist President who has vowed to redefine France’s Africa policy would attend.

Much to the dismay of some Congolese opposition forces who lobbied against his presence in Kinshasa, Hollande decided to make the trip – indicating however that he'll also be meeting with opposition and civil society leaders.

Now that this diplomatic hurdle has been passed, the Congolese government has some serious logistical challenges to tackle. In addition to lodging, transport is one of the major ones. Gridlock, dust and pollution, and breakdowns that disrupt traffic are the lot of commuters from Masina, Kimbanseke and N'djili. VIP summit delegates will soon discover Kinshasa’s transport nightmare.

A transport commission has been set up by summit’s organizing committee. The commission will provide 5,000 Lexus and Jaguar limousines to shuttle around the delegates. This seems incongruous on two counts. One, these limos will be travelling on some of the worst roads in an African capital (except for some refurbished stretches along the 30 Juin, Triomphal and Lumumba) and two, most Kinois ride in crammed taxi vans that are more akin to cattle wagons than passenger vehicles. The 5,000 limos are part of the presidential fleet!

The Chinese company SINOHYDRO is working on Boulevard Lumumba from the N’djili airport to the Limete bypass but it seems unlikely that they will finish the work in time. I traveled that road last week: construction progress is as slow as the traffic.

Even if the work isn’t finished to welcome the 3,000 delegates, the government has techniques to keep traffic off the roads to facilitate VIP arrivals and departures. One way is to announce spot checks to ensure drivers have their insurance policies and vehicle registration in order. As most don’t, they will avoid the city on those days.

M23 Fact sheet

The M23’s military actions have made news recently but media coverage has been very sketchy, making it difficult to draw a clear picture of what the group’s objectives are, how and by whom it is run and where it comes from.

Here is a humble attempt at making sense of these questions. It wasn’t easy filtering the propaganda from the facts so there may be errors.
Comments/corrections welcome.


Acronyms
- CNDP: Congrès national pour la défense du peuple
- FARDC: Congolese National Army
- FDLR: Force démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (armed Hutu group associated with the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide).
- LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
- RCD-Goma: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (Rwanda-supported rebel movement during the Second Congo War (1998-2003)
- RPF: Rwanda Patriotic Front (formerly a Tutsi diaspora political and military group, now the ruling political party in Rwanda)
- UPC: Union des Patriotes Congolais

Background
The M23 is rebel movement comprised mainly of Congolese Tutsis, who formerly comprised the CNDP. The M23 defected from the Congolese army in April this year amid pressure on the government to arrest General Bosco Ntaganda. It is the newest avatar of Rwandan support for Tutsi rebellions in Eastern DRC.

The CNDP was set up -and justified its actions- in Eastern DRC to fight FDLR forces and protect Tutsi minorities. It also sought to control mineral extraction and access to land.

The CNDP was a political armed militia established by Laurent Nkunda in December 2006. The CNDP’s strategic underpinning was the RCD-Goma, a rebel movement during the Second Congo War (1998-2003) that later entered mainstream Congolese politics. Its aim was the overthrow of the government of Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

In January 2009, the CNDP split and Nkunda was arrested by his Rwandan backers who made a deal with Joseph Kabila. Elements of a CNDP splinter faction, led by Bosco Ntaganda, were integrated into the FARDC, Bosco with the rank of General.

Until a few months ago, around half of FARDC officers stationed in Kivu came from the CNDP. Supported by Rwanda they continued to hunt down Hutu rebels hiding in the bush, including high-ranking Hutu officers such as Commander Emmanuel who was assassinated.

Actors
M23 political leader: Jean-Marie Runiga

M23 military leader: Colonel Jules Sultani Makenga

Spokesperson: lieutenant-colonel Vianney Kazarama


Bosco Ntaganda fought with the RPF during the 1994 Tutsi takeover of Kigali. He later served as military leader to warlord Thomas Lubanga who was sentenced to 14 years of prison by the ICC in July 2012. Lubanga founded the UPC. 

Bosco Ntaganda, nicknamed ‘the Terminator’, was protected by Joseph Kabila who used him to direct military operations in Kivi since 2009 against the FDLR and to facilitate illegal mineral exploitation.

Despite being sought after by the ICC for war crimes, Bosco was given immunity by Kabila. Bosco and the CNDP participated in vote-rigging and voter intimidation in favor of Kabila in the run up to the 28 November elections.

Soon after the elections, under the pressure from the international community and to appease factions of radical Congolese who were angry with the Rwandan influence in Congolese politics, Joseph Kabila decided to (i) reposition the Tutsis within FARDC to other regions of the DRC and (ii) declared his intention to arrest the renegade General Bosco Ntaganda. These were the two main issues of contention that violated the 23 March Agreement – explaining the movement’s name. Realizing that he could no longer count on Kabila’s promise for immunity, on 30 April, Ntaganda took to the bush with 600 to 700 men, some of the best of the CNDP’s 4,000 troops.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant against Bosco in 2006 for the same crimes against humanity for which Lubanga was convicted in March 2012. Lubanga was found guilty of using child soldiers in the 2002-2003 civil war in Ituri. Fighting between militias and interethnic violence over control of gold mines and other resources caused an estimated loss of 60,000 lives.

The 23 March Agreement
On 23 March 2009 the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the CNDP signed a peace agreement in Goma.

Signed by Dr Désiré Kamanzi, President of the CNDP and H. E. Mr Raymond Tshibanda, Minister of International and Regional Cooperation for the Government of the DRC, under the auspices of UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, H.E. Mr Olusegun Obasanjo and of the co-facilitator of the African Union and of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, H.E. Mr Benjamin William Mkapa, the parties formally agreed on 15 issues relating to:

Article 1: Transformation of the CNDP (ceasing its existence as a politico-military movement and integration in the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Article 2: Political Prisoners

Article 3: Amnesty

Article 4: National Reconciliation Mechanism

Article 5: Resolution of Local Conflicts

Article 6: Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced People

Article 7: Disaster Areas (reconstruction of infrastructure)

Article 8: Management of the Territory (based on local sociological realities)

Article 9: Public Administration (based on the proximity needs of local populations)

Article 10: Army and Security Services Reform

Article 11: Voting Procedure (assessment and revision of electoral law)

Article 12: Specific Issues (including ‘Parties agree to formally recognize the ranks of former CNDP members both in the Congolese National Police and in the FARDC’)

Article 13: Economic Reforms (including ‘Parties agree to the necessity for reliable and effective good governance and … control of natural resources’)

Article 14: National Monitoring Committee (in charge of implementing the Agreement)

Article 15: International Monitoring Committee (set up to monitor the Agreement)

Support from Rwanda
According to a leaked UN Sanctions Committee on the DRC report of June 2012, M23 has received support from high-ranking Rwanda officials such as Defense Minister James Kabarebe and Chief of Joint Military Staff General Charles Kayonga and Generals Jack Nziza, Emmanuel Ruvusha and Alexis Kagame.

Support takes the form of arms, heavy artillery, military supplies and new recruits.

Roger Meece, head of UN peacekeeping mission Monusco, declared that M23 combatants speak English and wear uniforms different from those of the FARDC.

An 'Africa Confidential' article suggests that Rwanda may not only be supporting the M23 rebellion, but may also be helping create a new state on its border with Congo. Pro-Balkanization forces have circulated the name ‘République des Volcans’.

Rwanda President Paul Kagame denies any involvement in the support of M23 or Balkanization.

Rwandan officials have been using social media networks in a lobbying campaign to improve Kigali’s position on the dispute concerning its involvement.

Military context
After days of fierce fighting in July, M23 rebels secured the economically strategic town of Bunagana on the Ugandan border prompting displacement of civilians and the fleeing of 600 FARDC troops over the Ugandan border. Having seized this key mineral transit town, the rebels proceeded to advance on Rutshuru, taking this and other towns close by. M23 forces encountered no resistance from the FARDC who abandoned their positions.

Throughout their advance M23 rebels have called for talks with the Kabila regime, stating that their aim is only to have their voices heard – meaning respect for the terms of the 23 March Agreement that Kabila reneged on.

The fighting between the rebels and the Congolese army has displaced more than 200,000 people in recent months, according to estimates by aid groups, with many fleeing to neighboring Uganda and Rwanda.

July 2012 Kinshasa sends its best troops to Kivu (the 321st and 322nd battalions trained by Belgium and the 41st and 42nd battalions trained by South Africa). The Congo government moved a US-trained battalion from the north of the country to Goma. The battalion was previously used in the hunt for LRA fighters.

But very few officers in the Congolese army received military training explaining their poor performance in confrontations with M23 forces.

June 2012: the UN Security Council renews Monusco’s mandate for another year.

Alliances have been forged in recent weeks between various armed groups including the UPC, M23, Mai-Mai Kava wa Seli and Mai- Mai Mandefu, who have joined together in the common cause of fighting Congolese government forces. The head of a Mai Mai group with alleged ties to M23, General Kakule Sikula Lafontaine, led an assault on an army base in North Kivu’s Lubero Territory in early June.

As FARDC committed resources to fighting M23, the security situation in other parts of the Kivu provinces degenerated.

On the frontlines in the fighting between M23 and FARDC, civilians are stranded or displaced causing a new wave of humanitarian crisis.

M23 Fact sheet

The M23’s military actions have made news recently but media coverage has been very sketchy, making it difficult to draw a clear picture of what the group’s objectives are, how and by whom it is run and where it comes from.
Here is a humble attempt at making sense of these questions. It wasn’t easy filtering the propaganda from the facts so there may be errors.
Comments/corrections welcome.

Acronyms
- CNDP: Congrès national pour la défense du peuple
- FARDC: Congolese National Army
- FDLR: Force démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (armed Hutu group associated with the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide).
- LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
- RCD-Goma: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (Rwanda-supported rebel movement during the Second Congo War (1998-2003)
- RPF: Rwanda Patriotic Front (formerly a Tutsi diaspora political and military group, now the ruling political party in Rwanda)
- UPC: Union des Patriotes Congolais

Background
The M23 is rebel movement comprised mainly of Congolese Tutsis, who formerly comprised the CNDP. The M23 defected from the Congolese army in April this year amid pressure on the government to arrest General Bosco Ntaganda. It is the newest avatar of Rwandan support for Tutsi rebellions in eastern DRC. 

The drivers are access to land and mineral resources. A weak Congolese state facilitates Rwandan involvement in the Kivus. The weak state is both cause and consequence.

The CNDP was set up -and justified its actions- in eastern DRC to fight FDLR forces and protect Tutsi minorities. It also sought to control mineral extraction and access to land.

The CNDP was a political armed militia established by Laurent Nkunda in December 2006. The CNDP’s strategic underpinning was the RCD-Goma, a rebel movement during the Second Congo War (1998-2003) that later entered mainstream Congolese politics. Its aim was the overthrow of the government of Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

In January 2009, the CNDP split and Nkunda was arrested by his Rwandan backers who made a deal with Joseph Kabila. Elements of a CNDP splinter faction, led by Bosco Ntaganda, were integrated into the FARDC, Bosco with the rank of General.

Until a few months ago, around half of FARDC officers stationed in Kivu came from the CNDP. Supported by Rwanda they continued to hunt down Hutu rebels hiding in the bush, including high-ranking Hutu officers such as Commander Emmanuel who was assassinated.

Actors
M23 political leader: Jean-Marie Runiga

M23 military leader: Colonel Jules Sultani Makenga

Bosco Ntaganda fought with the RPF during the 1994 Tutsi takeover of Kigali. He later served as military leader to warlord Thomas Lubanga who was sentenced to 14 years of prison by the ICC in July 2012. Lubanga founded the UPC.

Bosco Ntaganda, nicknamed ‘the Terminator’, was protected by Joseph Kabila who used him to direct military operations in Kivu since 2009 against the FDLR and to facilitate illegal mineral exploitation.

Despite being sought after by the ICC for war crimes, Bosco was given immunity by Kabila. Bosco and the CNDP participated in vote-rigging and voter intimidation in favor of Kabila in the run up to the 28 November elections.

Soon after the elections, under the pressure from the international community and to appease factions of radical Congolese who were angry with the Rwandan influence in Congolese politics, Joseph Kabila decided to (i) reposition the Tutsis within FARDC to other regions of the DRC and (ii) declared his intention to arrest the renegade General Bosco Ntaganda. These were the two main issues of contention that violated the 23 March Agreement – explaining the movement’s name. Realizing that he could no longer count on Kabila’s promise for immunity, on 30 April, Ntaganda took to the bush with 600 to 700 men, some of the best of the CNDP’s 4,000 troops.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant against Bosco in 2006 for the same crimes against humanity for which Lubanga was convicted in March 2012. Lubanga was found guilty of using child soldiers in the 2002-2003 civil war in Ituri. Fighting between militias and interethnic violence over control of gold mines and other resources caused an estimated loss of 60,000 lives.

The 23 March Agreement
On 23 March 2009 the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the CNDP signed a peace agreement in Goma.

Signed by Dr Désiré Kamanzi, President of the CNDP and H. E. Mr Raymond Tshibanda, Minister of International and Regional Cooperation for the Government of the DRC, under the auspices of UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, H.E. Mr Olusegun Obasanjo and of the co-facilitator of the African Union and of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, H.E. Mr Benjamin William Mkapa, the parties formally agreed on 15 issues relating to:

Article 1: Transformation of the CNDP (ceasing its existence as a politico-military movement and integration in the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Article 2: Political Prisoners

Article 3: Amnesty

Article 4: National Reconciliation Mechanism

Article 5: Resolution of Local Conflicts

Article 6: Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced People

Article 7: Disaster Areas (reconstruction of infrastructure)

Article 8: Management of the Territory (based on local sociological realities)

Article 9: Public Administration (based on the proximity needs of local populations)

Article 10: Army and Security Services Reform

Article 11: Voting Procedure (assessment and revision of electoral law)

Article 12: Specific Issues (including ‘Parties agree to formally recognize the ranks of former CNDP members both in the Congolese National Police and in the FARDC’)

Article 13: Economic Reforms (including ‘Parties agree to the necessity for reliable and effective good governance and … control of natural resources’)

Article 14: National Monitoring Committee (in charge of implementing the Agreement)

Article 15: International Monitoring Committee (set up to monitor the Agreement)

Support from Rwanda
According to a leaked UN Sanctions Committee on the DRC report of June 2012, M23 has received support from high-ranking Rwanda officials such as Defense Minister James Kabarebe and Chief of Joint Military Staff General Charles Kayonga and Generals Jack Nziza, Emmanuel Ruvusha and Alexis Kagame.

Support takes the form of arms, heavy artillery, military supplies and new recruits.

Roger Meece, head of UN peacekeeping mission Monusco, declared that M23 combatants speak English and wear uniforms different from those of the FARDC.

An Africa Confidential article suggests that Rwanda may not only be supporting the M23 rebellion, but may also be helping create a new state on its border with Congo. Pro-Balkanization forces have circulated the name ‘République des Volcans’.

Rwanda President Paul Kagame denies any involvement in the support of M23 or Balkanization.

Rwandan officials have been using social media networks in a lobbying campaign to improve Kigali’s position on the dispute concerning its involvement.

Military context
After days of fierce fighting in July, M23 rebels secured the economically strategic town of Bunagana on the Ugandan border prompting displacement of civilians and the fleeing of 600 FARDC troops over the Ugandan border. Having seized this key mineral transit town, the rebels proceeded to advance on Rutshuru, taking this and other towns close by. M23 forces encountered no resistance from the FARDC who abandoned their positions.

Throughout their advance M23 rebels have called for talks with the Kabila regime, stating that their aim is only to have their voices heard – meaning respect for the terms of the 23 March Agreement that Kabila reneged on.

The fighting between the rebels and the Congolese army has displaced more than 200,000 people in recent months, according to estimates by aid groups, with many fleeing to neighboring Uganda and Rwanda.

July 2012 Kinshasa sends its best troops to Kivu (the 321st and 322nd battalions trained by Belgium and the 41st and 42nd battalions trained by South Africa). The Congo government moved a US-trained battalion from the north of the country to Goma. The battalion was previously used in the hunt for LRA fighters.

But very few officers in the Congolese army received military training explaining their poor performance in confrontations with M23 forces.

June 2012: the UN Security Council renews Monusco’s mandate for another year.

Alliances have been forged in recent weeks between various armed groups including the UPC, M23, Mai-Mai Kava wa Seli and Mai- Mai Mandefu, who have joined together in the common cause of fighting Congolese government forces. The head of a Mai Mai group with alleged ties to M23, General Kakule Sikula Lafontaine, led an assault on an army base in North Kivu’s Lubero Territory in early June.

As FARDC committed resources to fighting M23, the security situation in other parts of the Kivu provinces degenerated.

On the frontlines in the fighting between M23 and FARDC, civilians are stranded or displaced causing a new wave of humanitarian crisis.

$8 Billion 2012 Budget Announced in Kinshasa

Prime Minister Matata Ponyo presented the 2012 budget to the National Assembly on Friday 22 June.

It amounts to nearly $8 billion, a 20% increase over last year’s budget. The budget has increased steadily over the past decade but remains proportionally insignificant to the country’s size, resources and population.

Internal revenues (mainly from taxation) come to nearly $5 billion. Contributions from international donors are $3 billion.

For reasons of comparison, the annual operating budget of Boston University is $1.6 billion.

Matata defined the need to build an effective state (25% of the budget), the imperative to develop basic infrastructure (18%), the revitalization of the main production sectors (25%) and strengthening human capital and improving social conditions of the population (30%) as his government’s main priorities.

Budget allotment and management is a good indicator of a government’s performance. Although a half-century of development aid shows that more money does not necessarily mean better results, it will be difficult to accomplish much in DRC with $8 billion.

Producing some visible, even small-scale development and social results, however, could contribute to establishing the relationship of trust that is so badly needed between the government and the people.

Disappointing European Parliament Resolution

The European Parliament published a resolution on the follow-up of the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 14 June.

It is a disappointing benediction of Kabila’s struggle to hold on to power. Kabila is gradually securing an important diplomatic objective as time goes by: European recognition as Congo’s de facto leader. The question of electoral legitimacy is fading out of the diplomatic debate.

European MPs lack either the political will or the understanding of the Congolese political landscape to issue a more meaningful declaration. The only relatively harsh statement in the resolution is that results of the November 28th elections remain ‘questionable’ due to ‘the lack of proper monitoring of these key electoral processes’.

Given the honest and critical report of the EU monitoring team led by Maria Nedelcheva, we could have expected European MPs to take a firmer stance.

Their resolution can be interpreted as wishful thinking for improved governance, utopian sentiments about Kabila’s good intentions, or worse – outrageous cynicism (we don’t really approve of Kabila but given his vulnerability we can deal with him and can carry on with business-as-usual).

Does anyone really care about the Congolese? Apparently European Members of Parliament do not.

ICG on MONUSCO & Powerlessness

Louise Arbour, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group published an open letter to the United Nations Security Council, calling for more creative thinking in its approach to insecurity in eastern Congo.

The letter merits a careful read. Congo experts won’t learn much from it, but it reinforces the view that a realistic diagnosis of the situation is a step towards solutions. Some interesting passages are indicated below:

… the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) is failing in its core mandate of stabilisation and protection of civilians.

The stabilisation strategy underpinned by MONUSCO was centred too heavily on an expectation that the 2008-2009 rapprochement between DRC and Rwanda was enough to contain the conflict in the Kivus. The bilateral agreement was based on President Kabila's willingness to integrate Rwanda's proxy CNDP forces into the army, but the strategy was short-sighted as it made no provisions for addressing the underlying causes of conflict beyond Rwanda's security objectives.

The current mutiny underway in the Kivus is perhaps the clearest evidence to date of how little progress has been made in stabilisation.

The 2008 and 2012 crises appear remarkably similar, including their ethnic dimension, reported support from Rwanda and the negative impact on civilians, including displacement and potential for increasing ethnic tensions at the community level. These crises are symptoms of unresolved regional and local conflicts over access to land and resources, as well as a failure to achieve structural reform within the security sector, poor governance and non-existent rule of law, and the inability to address the sources of financing for armed groups, end impunity and extend state authority, including through decentralisation.

Without a new approach and re-engagement by the Security Council, MONUSCO risks becoming a $1.5 billion empty shell.

MONUSCO has lost credibility on several fronts and urgently needs to reorient its efforts.

Durable protection of civilians will only come through an enhanced political process and the establishment of accountable state institutions.

… MONUSCO technical and logistical support to deeply flawed elections in 2011 and the inability to successfully promote dialogue between the parties has altered perceptions about the mission's impartiality… If not corrected, international involvement in the DRC, including through MONUSCO, risks entrenching an unaccountable government and undermining its own eventual rule of law and peacebuilding efforts.

The Security Council should undertake a review of MONUSCO's strategy and improve performance.

Clearly there is a need to address both local drivers of conflict between communities and the interplay with regional dynamics, including relations with Rwanda, whether through renewed political dialogue or a national accountability and reconciliation process, or both.

To bolster the government's accountability, the holding of credible provincial and local elections, including in the east, is essential. The mistakes of 2011 should not be repeated and clear standards on the organisation and holding of elections should be communicated to the government by the Security Council and MONUSCO, in particular serious reform of the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) and improved transparency in the logistics and supply procedures of the elections.

The Security Council should send a signal to the Congolese government and its partners that it is time for a new strategic dialogue. A business-as-usual rollover of MONUSCO's mandate will send the wrong message to all parties.

Matata, M23, Bosco Ntaganda: ‘Whiz kid’ in trouble

Despite a good dose of indulgence and wishful thinking, the news coming out of eastern Congo proves that Augustin Matata Mponyo’s government of ‘whiz kids’ (les surdoués) is in deep trouble.

The Matata government is unable to control the mutinies of FARDC troops loyal to CNDP’s Bosco Ntaganda in the Kivus and the commercial and military operations of the Rwandan-infiltrated M23 rebel group.

Matata lost credibility when a two-day transport strike brought Kinshasa to a standstill last month.

The World Bank suspended budgetary support in response to the poor management of the post-election crisis.

The UK government at the end of 2011 announced it would double its aid to Congo in 2012 but in March backtracked on that plan.

In the wake of botched elections in which no one really knows who won, Kabila needed to send some kind of positive message to international donors. So he appointed one of Congo’s better respected technocrats as Prime Minister. Matata Mponyo had previously earned credibility by his negotiations the World Bank and IMF officials while Finance Minister.

In July 2010, DRC reached the Completion Point under the HIPC initiative. This means that $12.3 billion of Congo’s $13.1 billion debt stock was forgiven. Strict criteria were required, including publishing information on partnerships with mining companies, improving the foreign investment environment, improving fiscal transparency and approving a law governing procurement practices. Implementing the Strategic Plan for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (DSCRP) that emphasized pro-poor spending was also a condition.

Granting Congo Completion Point status was based much more on political considerations than macroeconomic results. There was political motivation to stabilize Kabila in view of the then upcoming 2011 presidential elections. Matata, who is often described as ‘a brilliant technocrat’, provided Kabila with loyal service in these negotiations.

Matata survived with minor injuries the plane crash in which Augustin Katumba Mwanke died in February. Matata’s aura and the symbolism of walking out of a plane crash that killed someone more powerful than himself is not insignificant in Congolese culture.

But the image of being Congo’s top finance technocrat and a survivor has not really helped Matata manage the security challenges in the east.

Hailing from Maniema, which is neither a political nor economic high stake province, is emerging as a political handicap.

The best financial manager in Congo can’t be expected to master all of the country’s overwhelming challenges to reconstruction. From the security, social and political perspectives the Matata government is under pressure. Time will tell if a hobbled government will be an advantage or a disadvantage to a vulnerable and marginalized president. A weak government could be to Kabila’s advantage.

It’s no longer hakuna matata, but just matata throughout the Congo.

Population Census DRC

Jaynet Kabila, sister of the President and Member of Parliament put Prime Minister Matata on the spot last week. She raised the question in Parliament how the government plans on implementing its social and development objectives without knowing how many people live in the country. Matata’s five-year plan outlines six objectives. Deputy Kabila (representing Kalemie in Katanga) called for a comprehensive population census to be added as a seventh objective. Her question and recommendation obviously make sense.

It is assumed that Congo’s population is 67.8 million, that there is a 2.6% growth rate and an urban population of 35%. But these figures published by the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) are ‘guesstimates’. The last population census in DRC dates back to 1984 so no one really knows.

What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS? The two Congo wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) are reported to have resulted in an estimated 5.4 million ‘excess deaths’ according to the International Rescue Committee. How accurate are these casualty counts? Again we simply do not know.

A major obstacle to free and fair elections is the absence of reliable demographic data. According to demographer Léon de Saint Moulin, Kinshasa’s population was 9.7 million in 2010 whereas the CIA World Factbook placed it at 8.4 million (2011). When it comes to voter registration and constituency forming in a hotly contested arena like that of Kinshasa, this discrepancy is not trivial. 

The census is long overdue. The UN recommends that population counts be done every 10 years. Again, according to the UNPF, DRC is the only African country to have not carried out a census in the past 20 years. In post-conflict situations, efficient development, security and infrastructure planning depend on realistic population data. The data is fundamental for private sector investors and the land use planners who need to establish where to build schools, hospitals, roads, water pumping stations, electricity grids and government builds.

Census data is by its very nature sensitive: how many people live under a roof, age, sex, level of education, in some cases biometric information, etc. A reliable census is consequently based on trust. There is no guarantee that the necessary degree of trust between government and citizen currently exists in Congo to gather such comprehensive data.

The cost of a census in DRC is estimated at $173 million.

The United Nations Population Fund jointly with other UN agencies is supporting the Government of DRC in conducting a Population and Housing Census (PHC) planned for 2014. The fund's strategy is to enable national technical and management capacities in DRC to plan and implement high quality census taking. Another UN agency, UNOPS, is building regional offices to house the census work. Results of this census could be used for development planning, good governance and poverty alleviation.

Carrying out this population census is a major priority. Without reliable data, development planning will remain arbitrary, politically biased and ad hoc.

Matata's Five-Year Plan

Prime Minister Matata Mapon presented his five-year Programme d’Action du Gouvernement: 2012-2016 to the Congolese National Assembly last week.

Building on President Kabila’s new mantra ‘revolution and modernity’ the programme outlines six ambitious objectives: (i) institutional reform and reinforcing the efficiency of the state, (ii) consolidating macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and creating jobs, (iii) improving and developing infrastructure, (iv) improving living conditions for the population, (v) stimulating a sense of civism and (vi) improving Congo’s international relations and image.

The programme stipulates – but only in very general terms – how the realization of these objectives is to be financed. Three sources of funding are emphasized: (i) national fiscal revenues, (ii) public-private partnerships and (iii) support from bi- and multinational partners.

The 57-page document provides for very interesting reading. There are examples of critical realism: “L’économie congolaise a enregistré durant la décade 2000-2010 un taux de croissance moyen de 5%. Cette performance ne s’est malheureusement pas traduite par une amélioration correspondante de l’emploi et du bien être de la population” (section 3.1).

Some passages seem more likely to be read in NGO reports or academic papers than in a major official document: “L’amélioration de la gouvernance demeure un défi majeur pour le pays. Faute d’une volonté politique clairement affirmée pour le changement, la révolution mentale que requiert la situation restera un leurre” (section 4).

Last year’s agricultural law stipulates that only Congolese have the right to own land. Foreigners cannot be majority holders. In section 4.2.4 of Matata’s programme a similar constraint is announced. In the aim of promoting the middle class and protecting small shop-owners, “il est prévu de … interdire l’exercise du petit commerce et des petites activités aux étrangers…”.

Other items seem rather far-fetched in a five-year plan: providing villages with more than 500 inhabitants with wells (section 4.4.1.3), building factories to produce pharmaceuticals (section 4.4.1.6) or investing in the production of silica sands for solar panels (section 4.2.2).

The document is admittedly an outline and doesn’t have the ambition of developing in detail its points. Some ideas do nonetheless require clarification. What does this mean? “establish compulsory public service for people over 18” (section 4.5.2) or “humanize living conditions in prisons and make prisoners productive” (section 4.1.5).

Just days after Matata announced this ambitious programme, the President sent it back to the drawing board. Kabila asked the Prime Minister to rethink the ranking of his priorities because his ‘priority of all priorities’ is establishing security in the east.

From a development perspective, the five-year plan makes sense: implementing it however is going to be an uphill battle.

Matata the academic

Matata Mapon, the new Prime Minister is known as a good technocrat. His major accomplishment as Finance Minister was the debt alleviation package. In July 2010, just days after the 50 year independence celebrations, DRC reached the Completion Point under the HIPC initiative. This meant that $12.3 billion of Congo’s $13.1 billion debt stock was forgiven. Matata was previously a respected manager of the World Bank’s Bureau Central de Coordination (BCECO).

A lesser-known fact about Matata is his academic work. In 1999 he co-signed a really excellent book with François Kabuya Kalala: l’Espace Monétaire Kasaïen: Crise de légitimité et de souveraineté monétaire en période d’hyperinflation au Congo (1993-1997), published by CEDAF/Africa Museum/L'Harmattan. Jean-Claude Masangu Muongo, who was already Governor of the Central Bank, signed the forward.

The book analyzes how the two Kasai provinces refused to use new Zaire notes for over five years, while continuing to use demonetarized notes. The bills were very badly worn and had no legal basis but people believed in them. The creation of this unusual monetary space enabled the Kasais to avoid some of the serious macroeconomic problems that crippled other parts of the country. The book was well-received by Congo economy experts.

For a look at this other dimension of Matata-the-academic, see l’Espace Monétaire Kasaïen.

Chebeya Film Banned in Congo

Censurship is an ugly tactic of dictators.

Thierry Michel’s tragicomic film about the political assassination of human rights activist Floribert Chebeya has been banned in Congo.

After seeing the film, I was amazed that Michel had even been allowed to document the masquerade trail of Chebeya’s murderers.

But after its release in Europe and the US where it won numerous prizes such as the Grand Award at the International Human Rights Film Festival in Paris, Luzolo Bambi (Minister of Justice and Human Rights) formally requested the Congolese National Censorship Commission to ban the film’s distribution and showing. Why? Because certain sequences are allegedly disrespectful to President Kabila.

The trial’s outcome was disappointing. Lower-ranking henchmen were found guilty but the boss and probable godfather of the murder, John Numbi, was not put on trial. General Police Inspector Numbi was Kabila’s security boss from 2007 until his suspension in June 2010 following the international outcry caused by the murder. This native of North Katanga was not sacked but suspended and replaced by the Tutsi general Charles Bisengimana.

Very close to the president, Numbi was the architect of some special operations such as the joint Rwanda-Congo military operation in North Kivu and the bloody repression of the Bundu dia Kongo political religious movement in Bas-Congo. Numbi is too close to the president and knows too much to be put on trail.

The ban is an embarrassment for some European sponsors from France and Belgium that planned on showing the film in their cultural centers in Congo. It even puts into question holding the IOF Francophonie international jamboree in Kinshasa in October this year.

It would be shameful for the IOF to hold such an important summit in Congo until progress in the democratic process has been made.

The assassination of Floribert Chebeya - and Fidele Bazana who is commonly described as his driver but who in fact was a respected colleague of the Voix des Sans Voix leader is a hideous blemish on Joseph Kabila’s record.

It does however prove that some people in Congolese civil society refuse to be intimidated and dare to speak out. Chebeya’s fight, thanks in part to Thierry Michel’s documentary, lives on.

The US National Endowment for Democracy honored Floribert Chebeya posthumously with its Democracy Service Medal. Past awardees include Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel and the Dalai Lama.

Priorities of Congolese Citizens

'Reach Out to Us: Findings from Focus Groups with Young Men and Women in the DRC' is a timely and informative report produced by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Based on a focus group methodology, the report found that Congolese are primarily concerned about their economic subsistence. They want jobs and security; they are extremely unhappy with the current state of their country and they hold the government responsible for not addressing the country’s woes. People dream of a country where their basic needs are taken care of and where they can live in peace.

The report's findings are hardly surprising. The approach (twelve discussions in six provinces) may even be perceived as naïve, superficial or unrepresentative. Nonetheless, its message and approach are important.

Congo Masquerade repeatedly made the point that reform and development strategies in DRC fail because they are designed and implemented by experts who are disconnected from local reality and ordinary peoples’ perceptions of what needs to be done. Primary beneficiaries – the people- are insufficiently informed, consulted and engaged. State-building strategies are imposed upon them - they are not embedded in their expectations or needs.

By giving voice to the people, this report sends a clear message to Congolese authorities and international partners who now have meaningful political information from the streets and villages of Congo of how people see their future.

Political Maturity in Congo

The obvious news coming out of Congo in the past few months relates to electoral fraud, human rights violations and attempts at forming a government.

Examples of political maturity on the part of ordinary Congolese seem to me, however, to be under-reported. I spent a good part of March in Congo (Kinshasa and Bas-Congo) asking people what they consider to be signs of political maturity.

Informants bitterly reported that authorities (particularly those at the CENI) proved to be brilliant in their ability to cheat and manipulate the electoral process. But there was also a clear sense of awareness, maturity, patience and good judgement on the part of ordinary people. They claim to be informed of what is going on on the political landscape. They are committed to keeping Kabila under scrutiny saying ‘ce Monsieur doit être plus prudent’ and ‘la pression peut affaiblir’.

Despite the huge potential for post-electoral violence, people did not express strongly felt political frustration through violent means. There were incidents but these were relatively limited. Most of the violence that did take place was carried out by the police and military – not by the people.

The discourse of violence also mutated. Heeding the lessons of the Arab Spring, Kinois claim their cell phones (tshombo) are their weapons and text messages bullets. This was a concern to the government which shut down SMS transmission from 3-28 December.

Another example of maturity is voting patterns. Of course we don’t really know who won the presidential vote but the legislative results are truly remarkable. The vast majority of MPs who sat in the previous legislature were not re-elected. They were sanctioned for not delivering on their 2006 promises. They voted themselves $6,000 per month salaries and perks while neglecting social priorities.

People also said that the free tee shirts and tins of sardines that were distributed on the campaign trail were not going to influence their vote as in the past.

Important political figures – even some Ministers (José Endundo - Environment, Alexis Tambwe Mwamba – Foreign Affairs, Martin Kabwelulu - Mining, Raymond Tshibanda - International Cooperation…) were not re-elected. This proves that a well financed campaign is not enough to maintain the trust of a frustrated constituency.

Alphonse Awenza Makiaba, a man with no political experience who feeds his family by transporting bags of rice and manioc on his bicycle, was elected to represent the city of Kisangani at the national level! This candidat des pauvres generated massive popular support precisely because voters could empathize with him.

While ethnicity structures Congolese society, last year’s voting was not always tribal. The election of Désiré Khonde Vila-ki-Kanda is a case in point. Originally from Bas-Congo where he ran and lost in 2006, he now won a seat in the North Kivu city of Goma where voters remembered his accomplishments as Provincial Governor during the Mobutu years.

Dictatorship, war and social stagnation have taught Congolese to be patient. And patience is another sign of political maturity. While some people say that the election fiasco has discouraged them in participating in the voting exercise, others are already gearing up for the next round in 2016.

L'économie politique post-conflit de la RDC

La Section de l’Histoire du Temps Présent du Musée royale de l’Afrique centrale publie la collection Cahiers africains depuis 1993. Spécialisés en matière d’analyse politique, sociale et économique de la RDC, les manuscrits passent par un processus de peer review avant publication.

Nous avons reçu un manuscrit en français sur l’économie politique de la RDC depuis la transition post conflit et cherchons dès lors deux experts pour le peer review. Si ce travail vous intéresse, merci de me contacter : theodore.trefon@africamuseum.be.

Ce travail est non rétribué mais donne droit au choix d’un ouvrage de la collection.

Le volume (de 250 pages) est constitué des chapitres suivants :

1. L’analyse socio-économique de la guerre : Essai de modélisation théorique et évidences empiriques.
2. Transition démocratique et croissance économique.
3. La réhabilitation du système financier en période post-conflit.
4. Les stratégies gouvernementales de sortie de crise : Le programme des 5 Chantiers de la République et la coopération entre le FMI et la RDC.
5. La promotion de l’entrepreneuriat en période post-conflit.
6. Les défis de l’environnement international.
7. Reforme financière et croissance économique : Les dilemmes de la mise en œuvre du DSCRP en RDC.
8. Décentralisation et reforme de la fiscalité en RDC.
9. La dynamique des réseaux d’assurance mutuelle et informelle constitue-t-elle un filet de sécurité en période de conflit ou de post-conflit ?

Cinq chantiers rebaptized révolution et modernisation in Congo

In Kinshasa and on the road to Boma, I’ve noticed that the big advertising posters that pollute the landscape are spreading a new political slogan. Kabila’s smiling face - with strangely whitened complexion - is no longer associated with cinq chantiers but révolution et modernisation. In this country where transport advances at a snail’s pace, the new posters are outrageously cynical because they associate Kabila with a bullet train network for Congo.

The development programme launched in 2008 was a flop. Just like Kabila’s strategy to call 2010 l’année sociale, it was poor political strategy to campaign on. By the time the campaign officially opened, even the government had to admit that everyone recognised cinq chantiers as empty propaganda.

One of his worst scores was paradoxically precisely where some road improvements were made: the nation’s capital where Kabila has become persona non grata. Some central areas of Kinshasa (mainly the boulevards 30 Juin, Triomphal and Lumumba) benefited from road and infrastructure improvements carried out by the Chinese but the programme has not extended into the provinces. The other priorities, health and education, water and electricity, housing and employment did not produce any results.

Presidential candidate Nzanga Mobutu who was Minister of Agriculture under Kabila declared on Radio France International that there was never any discussion of cinq chantiers during cabinet meetings, adding that the programme was thought up by the Kabila parallel government.

A well-known opposition singer Bill Clinton (not to be confused with the former US president) produced a video clip showing an exasperated father taking his son by the hand to the renovated Boulevard de 30 Juin, telling him, if you are hungry, eat that! The message is that some prestige road work does not help the Kinshasa poor and hungry.

Hatuone kitu is Swahili for ‘we don’t see anything’. It is also the title of a song sung during the electoral campaign in Bukavu referring to the fact that there were no cinq chantiers projects in the Kivus.

Kinois cleverly transformed the name on a State-controlled television programme Cinq chantiers en marche (moving ahead) into cinq chantiers en marche arrière (going in reverse). Further mocking the slogan, they also say that personal struggle for life is their sixième chantier.

A mid-ranking civil servant working in the Ministry of Higher Education told me that until a few months ago, if he ever omitted mentioning cinq chantiers in any kind of project, his boss would say to him: ‘Do you want me to have problems with the Minister?’ Today, if he inadvertently does mention cinq chantiers, he is asked exactly the same question.

Soldiers mutiny in Ituri

Paid soldiers are happy soldiers. Unpaid soldiers can wreak havoc. Joseph Kabila would be wise to not forget this golden rule of political survival.

Radio Okapi and other media have reported a mutiny of two battalions – approximately 2,000 soldiers in Marabo (40 kilometers from Bunia ) in the north east Ituri territory. The mutiny is yet another blow to the Kabila’s fragile authority.

Salary problems started the movement. Last year a census was taken to establish the number of men in uniform compared to the ghost soldiers whose salaries were used to reinforce their pay. Once the ghost soldiers were removed from the payroll, real soldiers saw a cut in their pay.

A letter was sent to President Kabila complaining of the inhuman conditions soldiers are forced to brook and SMS messages were sent to the heads of the regional military authorities to reiterate their dissatisfaction. Their complaints read more like an NGO diatribe than a military declaration.

Major Faustin Balizana, adjunct commander of the 42nd battalion and spokesman for the rebellious troops, said soldiers continue to be poorly paid and are taken advantage of from the military upper echelons. He made explicit reference to the existence of mafia-style networks of corruption and theft of money that should go to foot soldiers.

Prior to the mutiny, approximately 30 well-armed soldiers deserted. Some headed back to their base but others are still on the loose in the vicinity of the Lubero forest.

200,000 national army troops and the majority of MONUSCO blue helmets are deployed in the east. They have not succeeded in bringing local militias, FDLR, FNL and the Lords Resistance Army under control. The political economy of plunder and blood minerals earnings are strong incentives to continue sabotaging the security landscape.

Land grabbing, sovereignty and a new agriculture law

Affirming national sovereignty is a recurring pattern in post-conflict situations. It can have positive implications for regaining a sense of national unity and reshaping identity. It can contribute to the state-building process.

Nationalisation of foreign held assets is an awkward form of affirming sovereignty: awkward because it tends to be applauded by local stakeholders in a populist logic without concern for broader macroeconomic considerations, but anathema to foreign investors stripped of their businesses. Arbitration between investors that were nationalised by Mobutu in 1973 and the Congolese government is still unresolved.

Congo’s new agriculture law is a measure that could be interrupted as a means of affirming national sovereignty. But it is too early at this stage to say if it will do more harm than good. Although the law itself has been approved by parliament and was signed by President Kabila on 24 December 2011, the by-laws and application measures are still being elaborated. This could take some time: Congo’s forest code became law in 2002 but the presidential decree establishing the implementation procedures was signed in 2005.

Foreign investors are legitimately preoccupied by the law and particularly by the terms stipulated in Article 16 which says that only Congolese have the right to land. Foreigners cannot be majority holders. In an attempt to reassure current concession holders Agriculture Minister Norbert Basengezi declared that only new concessions are concerned by this provision. The provision is considered by some as discriminatory and anti-constitutional because Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees investment rights to both Congolese and foreigners.

While article 16 is contentious (there are 84 other articles), the new law has been accepted enthusiastically by most Congolese and by many international NGOs. Approximately 70% of Congo’s population lives off the land. Farmer associations - with the support of internationals NGOs such as AgriCongo - lobbied their representatives to have the law approved. Congo’s rural populations welcome the law because they perceive it as giving them greater security in what is a very ambiguous land tenure context. The importance of family farming is now recognized.

Congo’s agricultural space is going to come under increased pressure as land grabbing becomes more systematic. Land ceded to China in Equateur Province for palm oil production is a concrete example. Future opportunities for biofuel production or REDD exchanges will have to be tracked carefully if the agricultural law is to live up to local expectations.

Lack of coherence with other development priorities is a challenge. Economy Minister Jean-Marie Bulambo announced the reduction of food import duties in May 2011. Staples like meat, poultry, fish, wheat and rice, etc. – all commodities that could be produced in Congo – are given priority over local foodstuffs. The logic here is to respect consumer demands more than the needs of producers. From a political point of view this made sense in the run-up to elections.

One major but still unresolved issue is the definition of broader land use strategies that give coherence to agriculture, mining and forestry policies. Another is infrastructure development that could help Congolese products be competitive for the national market.

Augustin Katumba Mwanke: profile & analysis

Augustin Katumba Mwanke died today in a plane crash near Bukavu.

Augustin Katumba Mwanke was Kabila’s éminence grise. His voice in economic matters was taken seriously. Already close to Kabila père, this Katangais (b. Pweto, 1963) was behind the Congo-China deal and was very influential in facilitating relations between the Kinshasa political elite and the mining sector. Although he did hold any official position in the Kabila cabinet, he was former head of the Alliance for the Presidential Majority (AMP).


Kabila already has serious problems managing criticism of the recent elections fiasco. The loss of his main advisor is an additional blow.

This former governor of Katanga (appointed by L.-D.Kabila in April 1998) served on the board of Anvil Mining. He was accused of financial wrongdoing by the UN group of experts investigating the illegal exploitation of Congo natural resources which led to his dismissal from the position of Minister of State Assets (portefeuille de l'Etat).

The profile below is excerpted and adapted from a classified cable by US Ambassador William J. Garvelink.

Known for his business acumen, political discretion and efficiency, Katumba made no secret of his desire to leave the DRC to become ambassador to Israel, Switzerland or South Africa.

Katumba was suspected of having significant health problems. He spent several weeks in South Africa in 2009 for medical treatment. The nature of his health problems is not known but some observers believe he was HIV positive. This theory would seem bolstered by his emaciated physical appearance.

Katumba rarely met with diplomats. He was viewed by many as a kind of shady, even nefarious figure within Kabila’s inner circle. A former financier who lived many years in South Africa before returning to the DRC after Mobutu’s departure, he is believed to have managed much of Kabila’s personal fortune.

He was known to be close to Dan Gertler, a mysterious Israeli trader in precious minerals who, according to some sources, lends Kabila his private jet for trips abroad. Gertler invited Katumba to Israel often. Although Katumba would like to go to South Africa, it seems that Pretoria would not accept him because of suspected illegal banking transactions in the past.

Before the crash, someone made a clairvoyant comment on a Congolese internet forum about Katumba. It seems an appropriate ephitaph: ‘les faucons, ils finirons un jour, croyez-moi’.

Congo divided again: Beyond the 2011 elections

President Kabila campaigned under the slogan "for a united Congo". However, the country now stands divided into two camps, between those who believe his re-election to be legitimate and those who don’t.

How then can the people of Congo build a more stable and effective democracy?
Can long-lasting solutions to the many challenges facing the country be found?
What can domestic and international actors do?

These questions will be discussed by a group of experts convened by the Royal African Society and the Oxford Central Africa Forum.

14 February, 16:00 to 19:30

School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Lecture Theatre G2, Russell Square Campus, London

Programme

Pragmatism trumps democracy in Congo

Maintaining the status quo and lack of leverage over Kabila is how Michelle Faul sums up the West’s response to Congo’s chaotic elections.
Full story.

Contested representations of Congolese Rwandophones

Lars-Christopher Huening has just defended a PhD dissertation on discourses about Rwandophones in the DRC. “A case of mistaken identity? The Kinshasa press, political discourse and contested representations of Congolese Rwandophones, c.1990-2005”.

Based on an analysis of the Kinshasa’s press, Huening historicises the continuous redefinition of conflicting identities as a constantly negotiated, politically contingent and ideologically malleable process.

Particular focus is given to the agency of political actors in using powerful memories and historical narratives to link the Rwandophone ‘other’ with future-orientated fearful visions of perpetual Rwandan expansionism. The dissertation provides new insights into the dynamics of exclusion as a principal dimension to the outbreak of Congolese domestic and, ultimately, interstate violence in the Great Lakes region.

For further information, contact Huening at: l.c.huening@googlemail.com

Who is in the cockpit?

Joseph Kabila has been invisible for the past month. Self-proclaimed president Etienne Tshisekedi will reveal the names of his cabinet any day now. The CENI has postponed the announcement of the legislative results until further notice. No one knows when provincial elections that will lead to the indirect vote for national senators will take place.

Who is running the country during this stalemate? Who has been running it for the past ten years? Joseph Kabila and his allies - in the Congolese tradition of extreme political secrecy – govern by network, not by institutions. Many official figures even at the ministerial level wield far less power than shadow advisors and partners.

Who is in control?

My opinion is we don’t really know. While there are some obvious heavy weights, relations between them are as unclear as who pockets earnings from mineral sales. A coup d’état in this context of political vacuum, grumbling by the military, social frustration and regime isolation really wouldn’t surprise anyone.

The éminence grise of the Kabila presidency is Augustin Katumba Mwanke. He does not hold an official position in the Kabila cabinet but his voice in economic matters is taken seriously. Already close to Kabila père, this Katangais was behind the Congo-China deal. He is very influential in the mining sector.

Adolphe Lumanu from Western Kasai Province, Minister of the Interior and Security, is another Kabila faithful. His appointment as minister followed a term as Kabila’s head of cabinet. Lumanu had the task of announcing the suspension of Numbi following the assassination of Floribert Chebeya in June 2010.

John Numbi had been Kabila’s security boss since 2007, holding the title of General Police Inspector. This native of North Katanga was not sacked but suspended and replaced by the Tutsi general Charles Bisengimana. Very close to the president, Numbi was the architect of some delicate special operations such as the joint Rwanda-Congo military operation in North Kivu and the bloody repression of the Bundu dia Kongo political religious movement in Bas-Congo.

Kabila succeeded in placing a faithful ally as president of the National Assembly to replace Vital Kamerhe. Evariste Boshab, from Western Kasai Province, has proved his loyalty to Kabila as head the president’s party, the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD). Given the composition of the National Assembly with its various political groupings, including loud opposition voices, Boshab’s role requires finesse and a lot of political savvy. His strong support from the all powerful Katumba Mwanke facilitates his role as institutional deal broker.

Another representative of the Katanga establishment is Jean-Claude Masangu Mulongo. Governor of the Central Bank of Congo since 1997, he is one of the country’s leading economists. First appointed by Mzee Kabila, he was confirmed by Joseph. Known as the father of the Congolese franc, Masangu played an important role in reconnecting the Congo with the Bretton Woods institutions.

Katanga Governor Moïse Katumbi is a rather unique actor. Super rich businessman turned politician, Katumbi combines tough business acumen with a populist approach to governing the mineral rich province. Respected and liked by the Katangese, he supported Kabila’s bid for re-election – obviously for the sake of his commercial empire.

Kabila’s twin sister Jeannette seems to have a strong influence over the president, especially with respect to commercial affairs.

Israeli businessman Dan Gettler, active in the mining sector and generous contributor to Kabila’s campaigns, is another personality that merits special mention. He was a key figure in the selling off of state mining assets to private companies at lower-than-value prices.

Church & politics in post-elections Congo

Religion has figured prominently on the Congolese political landscape since the colonial period. About 80% of Congolese claim to be Christian, predominantly Roman Catholic (50%).
The magnitude of the Catholic Church’s economic and social role is demonstrated by its capacity to provide health care and education - even after the collapse of State structures and institutions. It is also a political force: it contributed to destabilizing Mobutu through peaceful marches, sit-ins and demonstrations.
The Catholic Church has proven to be consistent and coherent – unlike, for example, most of Congo’s international partners.
Numerous prayer groups, exorcists, messianic and prophetic churches and evangelists have proliferated since the 1990s, especially in Kinshasa. These movements and individuals are popular not just among the poor: they recruit intensively among members of the political and security establishment. The spiritual leaders of these Christian ‘neo-communities’ are opinion leaders that occupy increasingly important positions of power. Methodist pastor and President of the CENI, Mulanda Ngoy is the most notable example.
Syncretic sects combine Christianity with traditional beliefs and rituals. The most popular of these sects is Kimbanguism, with around 3 million followers. Most non-Christians follow either traditional religions or syncretic sects. Witchcraft and sorcery remain important social realities.
The recent call by Congolese bishops for peaceful protests to be held next week follows an explicit condemnation of the government, referring to ‘treachery, lies and terror’ during the electoral process. Archbishop Laurent Monsengwo described the results as ‘illegitimate’ saying they 'conformed neither to truth nor to justice'.
The Catholic Church network had 30,000 election observers whose asssessment corroborated massive fraude, irregularities and intimidation.
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (CENCO) in a message entitled ‘The Courage of Truth’ called for the mistakes made in the presidential and parliamentary elections to be ‘corrected’ without however calling for the elections to be annulled. The message also implored security forces to 'disobey unjust orders'.
The bishops challenged the members of the Independent National Electoral Commission to change their practices or resign following the mismanagement of last year's presidential and parliamentary elections.
The Independent National Electoral Commission 'no longer enjoys the confidence of the population', the bishops said, and asked the parliament to review its composition and include members of the civil society for more independence.
While some of the elements in this declaraction are not sufficiently explicit , such as ‘correcting’ mistakes, the message itself is clear. The Church – with the tacit support of the Vatican – has opted to rachet up the pressure on an increasingly vulnerable government.