Leadership issues in Congo

Boston University's Leadership Corner asked me to comment on leadership issues in DRC.

Below is the text of that interview:

BU in Congo

Dr. Trefon, thank you for spending some time with me. One of the topics that BU students in the MSL program tackle is the definition of the term "leadership." It is a concept that seems simple at first, yet grows more complex the more you probe it. You have spent the past 25 years studying the politics and anthropology of state/society relations in Congo/Zaire. With that breadth of experience, how have you come to understand what it means to be an effective leader?

The main problem facing Congo today is precisely the lack of responsible leadership. In a country where political authorities do very little for their constituents, when officials do just a little, they are venerated. But this is populism and not real leadership. There are few outstanding figures on the political landscape with vision, those who are able to bring an end to corrupt government, reduce poverty, solve the country’s security problems or improve the well-being of ordinary people. This would require the talent of being able to mobilize people around shared objectives, the power to deal forcefully and pragmatically with regional and international partners and the capacity to manage the macro-economic challenges facing what has unfortunately become one of Africa’s notoriously failed states. President Kabila does not have these leadership credentials; ex-dictator Mobutu had the charisma and flair of what is sometimes expected of an African ‘big man’ but he used it against the interest of the people; the first democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated before having the chance to deploy his leadership skills.

The situational model of leadership focuses not only on the leader personally but also the context in which the leader operates. In Congo Masquerade, you focus on the ingrained political culture of corruption among the Congolese elite. What situational challenges do leaders (both within and external to the Congo) face in trying to improve the quality of life of the ordinary Congolese? In other words, besides being a strong leader in and of himself, what must a politician know about the Congolese system in order to be effective?

After 32 years of dictatorship, violent conflict and machinations orchestrated by Rwanda and a very difficult – but still unsuccessful political transition towards democracy, everything on the state-building agenda is priority. Public health, education, road infrastructure, providing people with water and electricity, re-engineering public service provision, creating the enabling conditions for political participation, etc. are all priorities. But there is no master plan shared by the Congolese authorities and their international partners. While many programs appear to make sense at the theoretical level, implementation is a real problem. The country is also vast (the size of Western Europe) and diverse (in terms of distribution of natural wealth, ethnicity and population density). Managing a country that is fragmented in this way is an additional challenge. Probably the most important thing for a Congolese politician or international partner to bear in mind is the only thing that is predictable in Congo is the unpredictable.

How does the ordinary, everyday Congolese citizen view the leadership of his or her country?

Congo is one, but plural at the same time. Again, the country is diverse and fragmented so it is impossible to expect a consensus on anything, let alone on leadership. This is a very hot question because presidential and legislative elections will take place at the end of November. Perceptions of political leadership in Congo have to be understood in terms of social issues. People are very frustrated by the lack of progress in the government’s development program known as ‘cinq chantiers’. There is a lot of justifiable grumbling about lack of water, electricity, roads and access to health services. Kabila has strong support in some provinces but faces heavy opposition in others. The fact that he was able to amend the constitution, to have a single round of voting instead of the two-round system is a distinct advantage for him so he is likely to win the elections. Winning the elections is one step, transforming it into legitimate authority based on respect and transparent negotiation is something else. People have become very skeptical about how much government can really do for them and have consequently come to rely on their own home-grown systems to survive.

Students learn in class at BU about leader emergence, or how one individual rises out of the crowd and assumes a meaningful leadership role. Often this emergence is due not only to the individual's traits, but to the perception of the individual by the others in the group. Have you witnessed any instances where an otherwise ordinary individual rises up from the ranks and assumes a leadership role, no matter how small?

As people expect relatively little from government, new forms of social organization emerge. Congo, however, remains a very hierarchical society, perhaps something that is a spillover from Belgian colonialism. Religious leaders, civil society activists, traditional chiefs, diaspora representatives, successful businessmen and women and even musicians are leaders and opinion formers that political authorities have to deal with.

I know that everyone at BU Brussels is very happy to have you join the team. Turning to your role at BU, what do you feel are the most important lessons that students can learn about leadership? What new understanding and knowledge do you hope to pass on to them in your class?


I’ve devoted the past twenty-five years to Congo/Zaire as a researcher, project manager, professor and consultant. My approach is policy oriented and I have tried to narrow the conceptual gap between political science theories on development and state-building and a grassroots, anthropological understanding of very local-level social dynamics.

My course at BUB accordingly focuses on international development. Specifically, the discourses, practices, strategies, pitfalls, challenges - and when relevant - success stories of this vast agenda. I try to avoid over conceptualizing or theorizing about these issues because at the Master’s level, students seem to be more motivated by pragmatic examples and case studies. Are the Millennium Developments Goals attainable? How does micro-finance work? How do you carry out stakeholder analysis in the field? What are the links between access to natural resources and well-being? The main messages that I try to convey are one, development is a very complex issue so we have to be culturally sensitive and humble, two, be open-minded – bringing in the private sector in development strategies, for example, is something that I explore with students and three, be prepared for the unexpected – the role of social media in the Arab spring is a good case in point.

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For further information: http://buleadershipcorner.blogspot.com

Theodore Trefon talks about his new book ‘Congo Masquerade’

Decentralization Ministry Abolished

Ex-Decentralization Minister Antipas Mbusa

Lack of progress in territorial decentralization has put into question the political will of the Kinshasa authorities to redefine the administrative map of the country and transfer rights and responsibilities to new decentralized political entities.

President Kalila just took a bold decision by abolishing the Ministry of Decentralization and Urban and Regional Planning. While it could be interpreted as reprisal against former rebel leader Antipas Mbusa and now ex-Minister of Decentralization for entering the race for the presidency, it is more likely a commentary on Kinshasa’s policy about this financially important and politically sensitive priority.

When the Congolese people ratified the 2006 constitution they were promised greater local-level autonomy within a three-year period. The aborted decentralization process reveals how an important constitutional commitment was made without taking into account overwhelming administrative, political and macroeconomic challenges. The commitment was also made without thinking through the mechanisms and technicalities of implementation. Research shows that low income countries emerging from conflict rarely have the human and material resources to make decentralization happen. It should have been obvious at the outset, given the extent of state collapse, Congo would not have the means or the political will to decentralize.

Decentralization is a complicated political process that requires the commitment and involvement of both central government and provincial authorities. It cannot take place in a democratic vacuum where political actors ignore – or distain – the principals of accountability. The process requires the establishment of overlapping interests and the achievement of mutual trust between the central government and representatives from the decentralized entities.

From the Kinshasa perspective, decentralization is antithetical to its efforts to consolidate power. The government’s objective is to capture and secure power, not redistribute it. A system has to be strong to share power; the Congolese government is too vulnerable to share.

Pre-election violence in Kinshasa: a hint of what’s to come



Dead soldier, Kinshasa, March 2007 @Getty Images

Pre- and post-election violence is to be expected in Kinshasa because insufficient effort has been made at trying to restore people’s faith in government or in improving their well-being. The government’s main objective in the past five years has been regime consolidation and personal enrichment, abetted by Congo’s compliant international partners.

Factional violence shook Kinshasa last week just hours after Etienne Tshisekedi officially entered the race for the country’s highest office by registering with the CENI.

UDPS headquarters was vandalized and the studios of a radio and television station close to the opposition - Radio Lisanga - were set ablaze on 5 September. A PPRD office was also destroyed. The next day police broke up a UDPS demonstration, killing one and wounding at least two others. The following night, the Congo Embassy in Paris was attacked with Molotov cocktails by unidentified assailants. Pursuing opposition politics abroad is an indicator of political repression back home.

Governor of the Kinshasa ville-province, André Kimbuta (whose son Gaylord Kimbuta was murdered in Belgium earlier this year) temporarily banned political demonstrations. UDPS and PPRD activists declared they would respect the ban. Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo spoke out, appealing for calm. UDPS has been demonstration in front of the CENI offices demanding access to their computer files to ensure transparency in the registration and voting procresses.

These flare ups are harbingers of what will come following elections. Results will be contested by the runner up with a possible Côte d’Ivoire style stalemate. The type of violence that resulted in hundreds of deaths in March 2007 when overzealous troops loyal to Kabila clashed with Bemba militiamen in Kinshasa won’t surprise anyone. Capturing power is one thing, but transforming it into a social agenda is something else.

Election snags in Congo

Pastor Ngoy Mulanda, president of the National Independant Electoral Commission - CENI, has systematically confirmed that elections will take place as scheduled on 28 November. But with less than three months to go, ballot boxes, voting booths and other equipment are unavailable. The material has not been delivered by Chinese, South African, German and Lebanese suppliers who have received 70% of their purchase fees. MONUSCO has committed to dispatching voting equipment within the country - but has refused to import it from abroad.

Ngoy has recalculated the budget. The new one is now $1.2 billion, up from $700 million. While international partners paid most of the voting costs five years ago, the brunt of the burden is on the Congolese government this time around. To generate money needed to carry out the polling, the government has proposed to sell of Gecamine state assets in what has been reported as shady deals.

There are growing concerns that the elections will consequently be delayed. While this is not a major problem for most of Congo’s international partners who are more preoccupied about fairness and transparency, delays would be severely condemned by opposition leaders. This is somewhat of a paradox because the opposition seems to timidly making progress in talks about presenting a single opposition candidate - so they could benefit from delays. Another concern about delays is that they will give the Kabila camp more time to figure out how to cheat on results reporting. This will be done by a sophisticated computer system that even the best intentioned elections monitors will be unable to control.

Congo Masquerade now available

I am pleased to inform you that Congo Masquerade is now available. Orders can be placed with Zed Books. Many thanks to everyone in Congo, Europe and the US who helped make this book possible.

Here is what the experts have to say.

'The Trefon volume is indispensable reading for all those interesting in post-conflict state-building. He provides a devastating critique of how the large international investment in this project in DR Congo has fallen far short, through the failings both of the external parties and the Congolese political elite.'
- Professor Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin

'Trefon's sweeping survey of reconstruction efforts in Congo, from bridge repairs to security sector reform, delivers a stinging indictment of both the Congolese government and its international partners, leaving no one unscathed. Sure to create controversy, this book makes for a compelling read and calls for an understanding of Congo and the Congolese on their own terms.'
- Professor Pierre Englebert, Pomona College

'Understanding the Congo -- formerly Zaïre -- is not easy, which explains why we tend easily to think according to clichés, old and new. If we are to move away from Manichean interpretations, including whether the Congo is or is not 'the heart of darkness', we need to rely on scholarship that is at once empirical and sensitive to the historical and cultural context of the country's present condition. Trefon's Congo Masquerade is an important contribution to such scholarship since it asks the right questions about why aid has failed to lead to the required reforms in the country. Focusing on the contemporary period, Trefon explains how state failure can be 'profitable' for those who control it and why the prevalent political culture prevents reform from taking root. Written in simple prose and short chapters, this book will provide a more convincing explanation of what is happening in the Congo than most other books available today. It should be mandatory reading for all those who are concerned with the country or are involved in efforts to reform the state and spur development.'
- Professor Patrick Chabal, Kings College London

'Trefon has written a compelling and well-informed account of the ever unfolding catastrophe that is the Congo; he ably chronicles the mixtures of incompetence, venality, and short-sighted selfish interests on the part of domestic and international actors that have been that country's undoing. This is an excellent introduction to the Congo's complex problems.'
- Dr Nicolas van de Walle, Department of Government, Cornell University

'An impressive piece of work. In 150 pages of concisely analyzed and carefully referenced data, Trefon covers the most salient features of the Congo's 'unending crisis'. There is plenty of blame to be shared, and Trefon evenhandedly identifies the tacit collusion that links the transnational networks of 'aid donors', INGO's, and local NGOs and Congolese actors. The combination of 'development aid' that 'neither aids nor develops with a largely impotent yet arbitrary state apparatus -the legitimacy of which has been in doubt for over fifty years- accounts in large part for the appalling gap between the Congo's potential and its enduring misery. In a nuanced yet compelling way, Trefon argues (as others have done for Liberia and Sierra Leone) for the need to 'put the state back in' and to reform it in such a way as to give it the capacity to deliver public goods. He also points out that, contrary to some Western stereotypes, the Congolese have maintained a genuine sense of national identity which (whether or not it represents a form of 'imagined community') suggests that the Congo is, in some ways, a nation in search of a state, and that 'state-building' may be a more urgent priority than 'nation-building'.'
- Edouard Bustin, Boston University

Kamerhe, Rwanda’s Trojan Horse?

Etienne Tshisekedi’s resounding success in Katanga and Kinshasa, where he filled the Stade des Martyres with over 80,000 followers, has given the Kabila camp good reason to worry. Only a few months ago, Kabila was riding high – the opposition was fragmented and there was cause to doubt the viability of Tshisekedi’s candidacy. Isn’t he too old and frail, intellectually diminished and unable to consolidate factions within his Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social ? His comeback has responded to those doubts.

If his success is a concern to Kabila, it is also a reason for Vital Kamerhe to rethink his strategy. It would make more electoral sense for Kamerhe, who has a relatively solid powerbase in theEast (but more in North Kivu than in South Kivu) to lend support to Tshisekedi in exchange for assurances to be appointed Prime Minister. Bemba hasn’t said much about what he thinks about a single opposition candidate, and his position counts (even though he currently sits in an International Criminel Court prison cell).

Though it seems rather far-fetched, some Congolese believe that Kamerhe is Rwanda’s ‘Trojan Horse’. The 'falling out' between Kabila and Kamerhe is seen as part of a Machiavellic scheme to destabilize the opposition. The rift they claim is a trick, master-minded by Paul Kagame who needs Kabila to stay in power so Rwanda can pursue its campaign to Balkanize the Congo.