M23 Fact sheet

The M23’s military actions have made news recently but media coverage has been very sketchy, making it difficult to draw a clear picture of what the group’s objectives are, how and by whom it is run and where it comes from.
Here is a humble attempt at making sense of these questions. It wasn’t easy filtering the propaganda from the facts so there may be errors.
Comments/corrections welcome.

Acronyms
- CNDP: Congrès national pour la défense du peuple
- FARDC: Congolese National Army
- FDLR: Force démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (armed Hutu group associated with the perpetrators of the 1994 Rwanda genocide).
- LRA: Lord's Resistance Army
- RCD-Goma: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (Rwanda-supported rebel movement during the Second Congo War (1998-2003)
- RPF: Rwanda Patriotic Front (formerly a Tutsi diaspora political and military group, now the ruling political party in Rwanda)
- UPC: Union des Patriotes Congolais

Background
The M23 is rebel movement comprised mainly of Congolese Tutsis, who formerly comprised the CNDP. The M23 defected from the Congolese army in April this year amid pressure on the government to arrest General Bosco Ntaganda. It is the newest avatar of Rwandan support for Tutsi rebellions in eastern DRC. 

The drivers are access to land and mineral resources. A weak Congolese state facilitates Rwandan involvement in the Kivus. The weak state is both cause and consequence.

The CNDP was set up -and justified its actions- in eastern DRC to fight FDLR forces and protect Tutsi minorities. It also sought to control mineral extraction and access to land.

The CNDP was a political armed militia established by Laurent Nkunda in December 2006. The CNDP’s strategic underpinning was the RCD-Goma, a rebel movement during the Second Congo War (1998-2003) that later entered mainstream Congolese politics. Its aim was the overthrow of the government of Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

In January 2009, the CNDP split and Nkunda was arrested by his Rwandan backers who made a deal with Joseph Kabila. Elements of a CNDP splinter faction, led by Bosco Ntaganda, were integrated into the FARDC, Bosco with the rank of General.

Until a few months ago, around half of FARDC officers stationed in Kivu came from the CNDP. Supported by Rwanda they continued to hunt down Hutu rebels hiding in the bush, including high-ranking Hutu officers such as Commander Emmanuel who was assassinated.

Actors
M23 political leader: Jean-Marie Runiga

M23 military leader: Colonel Jules Sultani Makenga

Bosco Ntaganda fought with the RPF during the 1994 Tutsi takeover of Kigali. He later served as military leader to warlord Thomas Lubanga who was sentenced to 14 years of prison by the ICC in July 2012. Lubanga founded the UPC.

Bosco Ntaganda, nicknamed ‘the Terminator’, was protected by Joseph Kabila who used him to direct military operations in Kivu since 2009 against the FDLR and to facilitate illegal mineral exploitation.

Despite being sought after by the ICC for war crimes, Bosco was given immunity by Kabila. Bosco and the CNDP participated in vote-rigging and voter intimidation in favor of Kabila in the run up to the 28 November elections.

Soon after the elections, under the pressure from the international community and to appease factions of radical Congolese who were angry with the Rwandan influence in Congolese politics, Joseph Kabila decided to (i) reposition the Tutsis within FARDC to other regions of the DRC and (ii) declared his intention to arrest the renegade General Bosco Ntaganda. These were the two main issues of contention that violated the 23 March Agreement – explaining the movement’s name. Realizing that he could no longer count on Kabila’s promise for immunity, on 30 April, Ntaganda took to the bush with 600 to 700 men, some of the best of the CNDP’s 4,000 troops.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant against Bosco in 2006 for the same crimes against humanity for which Lubanga was convicted in March 2012. Lubanga was found guilty of using child soldiers in the 2002-2003 civil war in Ituri. Fighting between militias and interethnic violence over control of gold mines and other resources caused an estimated loss of 60,000 lives.

The 23 March Agreement
On 23 March 2009 the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the CNDP signed a peace agreement in Goma.

Signed by Dr Désiré Kamanzi, President of the CNDP and H. E. Mr Raymond Tshibanda, Minister of International and Regional Cooperation for the Government of the DRC, under the auspices of UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, H.E. Mr Olusegun Obasanjo and of the co-facilitator of the African Union and of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, H.E. Mr Benjamin William Mkapa, the parties formally agreed on 15 issues relating to:

Article 1: Transformation of the CNDP (ceasing its existence as a politico-military movement and integration in the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Article 2: Political Prisoners

Article 3: Amnesty

Article 4: National Reconciliation Mechanism

Article 5: Resolution of Local Conflicts

Article 6: Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced People

Article 7: Disaster Areas (reconstruction of infrastructure)

Article 8: Management of the Territory (based on local sociological realities)

Article 9: Public Administration (based on the proximity needs of local populations)

Article 10: Army and Security Services Reform

Article 11: Voting Procedure (assessment and revision of electoral law)

Article 12: Specific Issues (including ‘Parties agree to formally recognize the ranks of former CNDP members both in the Congolese National Police and in the FARDC’)

Article 13: Economic Reforms (including ‘Parties agree to the necessity for reliable and effective good governance and … control of natural resources’)

Article 14: National Monitoring Committee (in charge of implementing the Agreement)

Article 15: International Monitoring Committee (set up to monitor the Agreement)

Support from Rwanda
According to a leaked UN Sanctions Committee on the DRC report of June 2012, M23 has received support from high-ranking Rwanda officials such as Defense Minister James Kabarebe and Chief of Joint Military Staff General Charles Kayonga and Generals Jack Nziza, Emmanuel Ruvusha and Alexis Kagame.

Support takes the form of arms, heavy artillery, military supplies and new recruits.

Roger Meece, head of UN peacekeeping mission Monusco, declared that M23 combatants speak English and wear uniforms different from those of the FARDC.

An Africa Confidential article suggests that Rwanda may not only be supporting the M23 rebellion, but may also be helping create a new state on its border with Congo. Pro-Balkanization forces have circulated the name ‘République des Volcans’.

Rwanda President Paul Kagame denies any involvement in the support of M23 or Balkanization.

Rwandan officials have been using social media networks in a lobbying campaign to improve Kigali’s position on the dispute concerning its involvement.

Military context
After days of fierce fighting in July, M23 rebels secured the economically strategic town of Bunagana on the Ugandan border prompting displacement of civilians and the fleeing of 600 FARDC troops over the Ugandan border. Having seized this key mineral transit town, the rebels proceeded to advance on Rutshuru, taking this and other towns close by. M23 forces encountered no resistance from the FARDC who abandoned their positions.

Throughout their advance M23 rebels have called for talks with the Kabila regime, stating that their aim is only to have their voices heard – meaning respect for the terms of the 23 March Agreement that Kabila reneged on.

The fighting between the rebels and the Congolese army has displaced more than 200,000 people in recent months, according to estimates by aid groups, with many fleeing to neighboring Uganda and Rwanda.

July 2012 Kinshasa sends its best troops to Kivu (the 321st and 322nd battalions trained by Belgium and the 41st and 42nd battalions trained by South Africa). The Congo government moved a US-trained battalion from the north of the country to Goma. The battalion was previously used in the hunt for LRA fighters.

But very few officers in the Congolese army received military training explaining their poor performance in confrontations with M23 forces.

June 2012: the UN Security Council renews Monusco’s mandate for another year.

Alliances have been forged in recent weeks between various armed groups including the UPC, M23, Mai-Mai Kava wa Seli and Mai- Mai Mandefu, who have joined together in the common cause of fighting Congolese government forces. The head of a Mai Mai group with alleged ties to M23, General Kakule Sikula Lafontaine, led an assault on an army base in North Kivu’s Lubero Territory in early June.

As FARDC committed resources to fighting M23, the security situation in other parts of the Kivu provinces degenerated.

On the frontlines in the fighting between M23 and FARDC, civilians are stranded or displaced causing a new wave of humanitarian crisis.

$8 Billion 2012 Budget Announced in Kinshasa

Prime Minister Matata Ponyo presented the 2012 budget to the National Assembly on Friday 22 June.

It amounts to nearly $8 billion, a 20% increase over last year’s budget. The budget has increased steadily over the past decade but remains proportionally insignificant to the country’s size, resources and population.

Internal revenues (mainly from taxation) come to nearly $5 billion. Contributions from international donors are $3 billion.

For reasons of comparison, the annual operating budget of Boston University is $1.6 billion.

Matata defined the need to build an effective state (25% of the budget), the imperative to develop basic infrastructure (18%), the revitalization of the main production sectors (25%) and strengthening human capital and improving social conditions of the population (30%) as his government’s main priorities.

Budget allotment and management is a good indicator of a government’s performance. Although a half-century of development aid shows that more money does not necessarily mean better results, it will be difficult to accomplish much in DRC with $8 billion.

Producing some visible, even small-scale development and social results, however, could contribute to establishing the relationship of trust that is so badly needed between the government and the people.

Disappointing European Parliament Resolution

The European Parliament published a resolution on the follow-up of the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo on 14 June.

It is a disappointing benediction of Kabila’s struggle to hold on to power. Kabila is gradually securing an important diplomatic objective as time goes by: European recognition as Congo’s de facto leader. The question of electoral legitimacy is fading out of the diplomatic debate.

European MPs lack either the political will or the understanding of the Congolese political landscape to issue a more meaningful declaration. The only relatively harsh statement in the resolution is that results of the November 28th elections remain ‘questionable’ due to ‘the lack of proper monitoring of these key electoral processes’.

Given the honest and critical report of the EU monitoring team led by Maria Nedelcheva, we could have expected European MPs to take a firmer stance.

Their resolution can be interpreted as wishful thinking for improved governance, utopian sentiments about Kabila’s good intentions, or worse – outrageous cynicism (we don’t really approve of Kabila but given his vulnerability we can deal with him and can carry on with business-as-usual).

Does anyone really care about the Congolese? Apparently European Members of Parliament do not.

ICG on MONUSCO & Powerlessness

Louise Arbour, President and CEO of the International Crisis Group published an open letter to the United Nations Security Council, calling for more creative thinking in its approach to insecurity in eastern Congo.

The letter merits a careful read. Congo experts won’t learn much from it, but it reinforces the view that a realistic diagnosis of the situation is a step towards solutions. Some interesting passages are indicated below:

… the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) is failing in its core mandate of stabilisation and protection of civilians.

The stabilisation strategy underpinned by MONUSCO was centred too heavily on an expectation that the 2008-2009 rapprochement between DRC and Rwanda was enough to contain the conflict in the Kivus. The bilateral agreement was based on President Kabila's willingness to integrate Rwanda's proxy CNDP forces into the army, but the strategy was short-sighted as it made no provisions for addressing the underlying causes of conflict beyond Rwanda's security objectives.

The current mutiny underway in the Kivus is perhaps the clearest evidence to date of how little progress has been made in stabilisation.

The 2008 and 2012 crises appear remarkably similar, including their ethnic dimension, reported support from Rwanda and the negative impact on civilians, including displacement and potential for increasing ethnic tensions at the community level. These crises are symptoms of unresolved regional and local conflicts over access to land and resources, as well as a failure to achieve structural reform within the security sector, poor governance and non-existent rule of law, and the inability to address the sources of financing for armed groups, end impunity and extend state authority, including through decentralisation.

Without a new approach and re-engagement by the Security Council, MONUSCO risks becoming a $1.5 billion empty shell.

MONUSCO has lost credibility on several fronts and urgently needs to reorient its efforts.

Durable protection of civilians will only come through an enhanced political process and the establishment of accountable state institutions.

… MONUSCO technical and logistical support to deeply flawed elections in 2011 and the inability to successfully promote dialogue between the parties has altered perceptions about the mission's impartiality… If not corrected, international involvement in the DRC, including through MONUSCO, risks entrenching an unaccountable government and undermining its own eventual rule of law and peacebuilding efforts.

The Security Council should undertake a review of MONUSCO's strategy and improve performance.

Clearly there is a need to address both local drivers of conflict between communities and the interplay with regional dynamics, including relations with Rwanda, whether through renewed political dialogue or a national accountability and reconciliation process, or both.

To bolster the government's accountability, the holding of credible provincial and local elections, including in the east, is essential. The mistakes of 2011 should not be repeated and clear standards on the organisation and holding of elections should be communicated to the government by the Security Council and MONUSCO, in particular serious reform of the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI) and improved transparency in the logistics and supply procedures of the elections.

The Security Council should send a signal to the Congolese government and its partners that it is time for a new strategic dialogue. A business-as-usual rollover of MONUSCO's mandate will send the wrong message to all parties.

Matata, M23, Bosco Ntaganda: ‘Whiz kid’ in trouble

Despite a good dose of indulgence and wishful thinking, the news coming out of eastern Congo proves that Augustin Matata Mponyo’s government of ‘whiz kids’ (les surdoués) is in deep trouble.

The Matata government is unable to control the mutinies of FARDC troops loyal to CNDP’s Bosco Ntaganda in the Kivus and the commercial and military operations of the Rwandan-infiltrated M23 rebel group.

Matata lost credibility when a two-day transport strike brought Kinshasa to a standstill last month.

The World Bank suspended budgetary support in response to the poor management of the post-election crisis.

The UK government at the end of 2011 announced it would double its aid to Congo in 2012 but in March backtracked on that plan.

In the wake of botched elections in which no one really knows who won, Kabila needed to send some kind of positive message to international donors. So he appointed one of Congo’s better respected technocrats as Prime Minister. Matata Mponyo had previously earned credibility by his negotiations the World Bank and IMF officials while Finance Minister.

In July 2010, DRC reached the Completion Point under the HIPC initiative. This means that $12.3 billion of Congo’s $13.1 billion debt stock was forgiven. Strict criteria were required, including publishing information on partnerships with mining companies, improving the foreign investment environment, improving fiscal transparency and approving a law governing procurement practices. Implementing the Strategic Plan for Growth and Poverty Alleviation (DSCRP) that emphasized pro-poor spending was also a condition.

Granting Congo Completion Point status was based much more on political considerations than macroeconomic results. There was political motivation to stabilize Kabila in view of the then upcoming 2011 presidential elections. Matata, who is often described as ‘a brilliant technocrat’, provided Kabila with loyal service in these negotiations.

Matata survived with minor injuries the plane crash in which Augustin Katumba Mwanke died in February. Matata’s aura and the symbolism of walking out of a plane crash that killed someone more powerful than himself is not insignificant in Congolese culture.

But the image of being Congo’s top finance technocrat and a survivor has not really helped Matata manage the security challenges in the east.

Hailing from Maniema, which is neither a political nor economic high stake province, is emerging as a political handicap.

The best financial manager in Congo can’t be expected to master all of the country’s overwhelming challenges to reconstruction. From the security, social and political perspectives the Matata government is under pressure. Time will tell if a hobbled government will be an advantage or a disadvantage to a vulnerable and marginalized president. A weak government could be to Kabila’s advantage.

It’s no longer hakuna matata, but just matata throughout the Congo.

Population Census DRC

Jaynet Kabila, sister of the President and Member of Parliament put Prime Minister Matata on the spot last week. She raised the question in Parliament how the government plans on implementing its social and development objectives without knowing how many people live in the country. Matata’s five-year plan outlines six objectives. Deputy Kabila (representing Kalemie in Katanga) called for a comprehensive population census to be added as a seventh objective. Her question and recommendation obviously make sense.

It is assumed that Congo’s population is 67.8 million, that there is a 2.6% growth rate and an urban population of 35%. But these figures published by the United Nations Population Fund (UNPF) are ‘guesstimates’. The last population census in DRC dates back to 1984 so no one really knows.

What has been the impact of HIV/AIDS? The two Congo wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) are reported to have resulted in an estimated 5.4 million ‘excess deaths’ according to the International Rescue Committee. How accurate are these casualty counts? Again we simply do not know.

A major obstacle to free and fair elections is the absence of reliable demographic data. According to demographer Léon de Saint Moulin, Kinshasa’s population was 9.7 million in 2010 whereas the CIA World Factbook placed it at 8.4 million (2011). When it comes to voter registration and constituency forming in a hotly contested arena like that of Kinshasa, this discrepancy is not trivial. 

The census is long overdue. The UN recommends that population counts be done every 10 years. Again, according to the UNPF, DRC is the only African country to have not carried out a census in the past 20 years. In post-conflict situations, efficient development, security and infrastructure planning depend on realistic population data. The data is fundamental for private sector investors and the land use planners who need to establish where to build schools, hospitals, roads, water pumping stations, electricity grids and government builds.

Census data is by its very nature sensitive: how many people live under a roof, age, sex, level of education, in some cases biometric information, etc. A reliable census is consequently based on trust. There is no guarantee that the necessary degree of trust between government and citizen currently exists in Congo to gather such comprehensive data.

The cost of a census in DRC is estimated at $173 million.

The United Nations Population Fund jointly with other UN agencies is supporting the Government of DRC in conducting a Population and Housing Census (PHC) planned for 2014. The fund's strategy is to enable national technical and management capacities in DRC to plan and implement high quality census taking. Another UN agency, UNOPS, is building regional offices to house the census work. Results of this census could be used for development planning, good governance and poverty alleviation.

Carrying out this population census is a major priority. Without reliable data, development planning will remain arbitrary, politically biased and ad hoc.

Matata's Five-Year Plan

Prime Minister Matata Mapon presented his five-year Programme d’Action du Gouvernement: 2012-2016 to the Congolese National Assembly last week.

Building on President Kabila’s new mantra ‘revolution and modernity’ the programme outlines six ambitious objectives: (i) institutional reform and reinforcing the efficiency of the state, (ii) consolidating macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and creating jobs, (iii) improving and developing infrastructure, (iv) improving living conditions for the population, (v) stimulating a sense of civism and (vi) improving Congo’s international relations and image.

The programme stipulates – but only in very general terms – how the realization of these objectives is to be financed. Three sources of funding are emphasized: (i) national fiscal revenues, (ii) public-private partnerships and (iii) support from bi- and multinational partners.

The 57-page document provides for very interesting reading. There are examples of critical realism: “L’économie congolaise a enregistré durant la décade 2000-2010 un taux de croissance moyen de 5%. Cette performance ne s’est malheureusement pas traduite par une amélioration correspondante de l’emploi et du bien être de la population” (section 3.1).

Some passages seem more likely to be read in NGO reports or academic papers than in a major official document: “L’amélioration de la gouvernance demeure un défi majeur pour le pays. Faute d’une volonté politique clairement affirmée pour le changement, la révolution mentale que requiert la situation restera un leurre” (section 4).

Last year’s agricultural law stipulates that only Congolese have the right to own land. Foreigners cannot be majority holders. In section 4.2.4 of Matata’s programme a similar constraint is announced. In the aim of promoting the middle class and protecting small shop-owners, “il est prévu de … interdire l’exercise du petit commerce et des petites activités aux étrangers…”.

Other items seem rather far-fetched in a five-year plan: providing villages with more than 500 inhabitants with wells (section 4.4.1.3), building factories to produce pharmaceuticals (section 4.4.1.6) or investing in the production of silica sands for solar panels (section 4.2.2).

The document is admittedly an outline and doesn’t have the ambition of developing in detail its points. Some ideas do nonetheless require clarification. What does this mean? “establish compulsory public service for people over 18” (section 4.5.2) or “humanize living conditions in prisons and make prisoners productive” (section 4.1.5).

Just days after Matata announced this ambitious programme, the President sent it back to the drawing board. Kabila asked the Prime Minister to rethink the ranking of his priorities because his ‘priority of all priorities’ is establishing security in the east.

From a development perspective, the five-year plan makes sense: implementing it however is going to be an uphill battle.