Sunday, 25 September 2011
Monday, 12 September 2011
Decentralization Ministry Abolished
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| Ex-Decentralization Minister Antipas Mbusa |
Lack of progress in territorial decentralization has put into question the political will of the Kinshasa authorities to redefine the administrative map of the country and transfer rights and responsibilities to new decentralized political entities.
President Kalila just took a bold decision by abolishing the Ministry of Decentralization and Urban and Regional Planning. While it could be interpreted as reprisal against former rebel leader Antipas Mbusa and now ex-Minister of Decentralization for entering the race for the presidency, it is more likely a commentary on Kinshasa’s policy about this financially important and politically sensitive priority.
When the Congolese people ratified the 2006 constitution they were promised greater local-level autonomy within a three-year period. The aborted decentralization process reveals how an important constitutional commitment was made without taking into account overwhelming administrative, political and macroeconomic challenges. The commitment was also made without thinking through the mechanisms and technicalities of implementation. Research shows that low income countries emerging from conflict rarely have the human and material resources to make decentralization happen. It should have been obvious at the outset, given the extent of state collapse, Congo would not have the means or the political will to decentralize.
Decentralization is a complicated political process that requires the commitment and involvement of both central government and provincial authorities. It cannot take place in a democratic vacuum where political actors ignore – or distain – the principals of accountability. The process requires the establishment of overlapping interests and the achievement of mutual trust between the central government and representatives from the decentralized entities.
From the Kinshasa perspective, decentralization is antithetical to its efforts to consolidate power. The government’s objective is to capture and secure power, not redistribute it. A system has to be strong to share power; the Congolese government is too vulnerable to share.
Sunday, 11 September 2011
Pre-election violence in Kinshasa: a hint of what’s to come
Pre- and post-election violence is to be expected in Kinshasa because insufficient effort has been made at trying to restore people’s faith in government or in improving their well-being. The government’s main objective in the past five years has been regime consolidation and personal enrichment, abetted by Congo’s compliant international partners.
Factional violence shook Kinshasa last week just hours after Etienne Tshisekedi officially entered the race for the country’s highest office by registering with the CENI.
UDPS headquarters was vandalized and the studios of a radio and television station close to the opposition - Radio Lisanga - were set ablaze on 5 September. A PPRD office was also destroyed. The next day police broke up a UDPS demonstration, killing one and wounding at least two others. The following night, the Congo Embassy in Paris was attacked with Molotov cocktails by unidentified assailants. Pursuing opposition politics abroad is an indicator of political repression back home.
Governor of the Kinshasa ville-province, André Kimbuta (whose son Gaylord Kimbuta was murdered in Belgium earlier this year) temporarily banned political demonstrations. UDPS and PPRD activists declared they would respect the ban. Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo spoke out, appealing for calm. UDPS has been demonstration in front of the CENI offices demanding access to their computer files to ensure transparency in the registration and voting procresses.
These flare ups are harbingers of what will come following elections. Results will be contested by the runner up with a possible Côte d’Ivoire style stalemate. The type of violence that resulted in hundreds of deaths in March 2007 when overzealous troops loyal to Kabila clashed with Bemba militiamen in Kinshasa won’t surprise anyone. Capturing power is one thing, but transforming it into a social agenda is something else.
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| Dead soldier, Kinshasa, March 2007 @Getty Images |
Factional violence shook Kinshasa last week just hours after Etienne Tshisekedi officially entered the race for the country’s highest office by registering with the CENI.
UDPS headquarters was vandalized and the studios of a radio and television station close to the opposition - Radio Lisanga - were set ablaze on 5 September. A PPRD office was also destroyed. The next day police broke up a UDPS demonstration, killing one and wounding at least two others. The following night, the Congo Embassy in Paris was attacked with Molotov cocktails by unidentified assailants. Pursuing opposition politics abroad is an indicator of political repression back home.
Governor of the Kinshasa ville-province, André Kimbuta (whose son Gaylord Kimbuta was murdered in Belgium earlier this year) temporarily banned political demonstrations. UDPS and PPRD activists declared they would respect the ban. Cardinal Laurent Monsengwo spoke out, appealing for calm. UDPS has been demonstration in front of the CENI offices demanding access to their computer files to ensure transparency in the registration and voting procresses.
These flare ups are harbingers of what will come following elections. Results will be contested by the runner up with a possible Côte d’Ivoire style stalemate. The type of violence that resulted in hundreds of deaths in March 2007 when overzealous troops loyal to Kabila clashed with Bemba militiamen in Kinshasa won’t surprise anyone. Capturing power is one thing, but transforming it into a social agenda is something else.
Sunday, 4 September 2011
Election snags in Congo
Ngoy has recalculated the budget. The new one is now $1.2 billion, up from $700 million. While international partners paid most of the voting costs five years ago, the brunt of the burden is on the Congolese government this time around. To generate money needed to carry out the polling, the government has proposed to sell of Gecamine state assets in what has been reported as shady deals.
There are growing concerns that the elections will consequently be delayed. While this is not a major problem for most of Congo’s international partners who are more preoccupied about fairness and transparency, delays would be severely condemned by opposition leaders. This is somewhat of a paradox because the opposition seems to timidly making progress in talks about presenting a single opposition candidate - so they could benefit from delays. Another concern about delays is that they will give the Kabila camp more time to figure out how to cheat on results reporting. This will be done by a sophisticated computer system that even the best intentioned elections monitors will be unable to control.
Sunday, 28 August 2011
Congo Masquerade now available
I am pleased to inform you that Congo Masquerade is now available. Orders can be placed with Zed Books. Many thanks to everyone in Congo, Europe and the US who helped make this book possible.
Here is what the experts have to say.
'The Trefon volume is indispensable reading for all those interesting in post-conflict state-building. He provides a devastating critique of how the large international investment in this project in DR Congo has fallen far short, through the failings both of the external parties and the Congolese political elite.'
- Professor Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin
'Trefon's sweeping survey of reconstruction efforts in Congo, from bridge repairs to security sector reform, delivers a stinging indictment of both the Congolese government and its international partners, leaving no one unscathed. Sure to create controversy, this book makes for a compelling read and calls for an understanding of Congo and the Congolese on their own terms.'
- Professor Pierre Englebert, Pomona College
'Understanding the Congo -- formerly Zaïre -- is not easy, which explains why we tend easily to think according to clichés, old and new. If we are to move away from Manichean interpretations, including whether the Congo is or is not 'the heart of darkness', we need to rely on scholarship that is at once empirical and sensitive to the historical and cultural context of the country's present condition. Trefon's Congo Masquerade is an important contribution to such scholarship since it asks the right questions about why aid has failed to lead to the required reforms in the country. Focusing on the contemporary period, Trefon explains how state failure can be 'profitable' for those who control it and why the prevalent political culture prevents reform from taking root. Written in simple prose and short chapters, this book will provide a more convincing explanation of what is happening in the Congo than most other books available today. It should be mandatory reading for all those who are concerned with the country or are involved in efforts to reform the state and spur development.'
- Professor Patrick Chabal, Kings College London
'Trefon has written a compelling and well-informed account of the ever unfolding catastrophe that is the Congo; he ably chronicles the mixtures of incompetence, venality, and short-sighted selfish interests on the part of domestic and international actors that have been that country's undoing. This is an excellent introduction to the Congo's complex problems.'
- Dr Nicolas van de Walle, Department of Government, Cornell University
'An impressive piece of work. In 150 pages of concisely analyzed and carefully referenced data, Trefon covers the most salient features of the Congo's 'unending crisis'. There is plenty of blame to be shared, and Trefon evenhandedly identifies the tacit collusion that links the transnational networks of 'aid donors', INGO's, and local NGOs and Congolese actors. The combination of 'development aid' that 'neither aids nor develops with a largely impotent yet arbitrary state apparatus -the legitimacy of which has been in doubt for over fifty years- accounts in large part for the appalling gap between the Congo's potential and its enduring misery. In a nuanced yet compelling way, Trefon argues (as others have done for Liberia and Sierra Leone) for the need to 'put the state back in' and to reform it in such a way as to give it the capacity to deliver public goods. He also points out that, contrary to some Western stereotypes, the Congolese have maintained a genuine sense of national identity which (whether or not it represents a form of 'imagined community') suggests that the Congo is, in some ways, a nation in search of a state, and that 'state-building' may be a more urgent priority than 'nation-building'.'
- Edouard Bustin, Boston University
Here is what the experts have to say.
'The Trefon volume is indispensable reading for all those interesting in post-conflict state-building. He provides a devastating critique of how the large international investment in this project in DR Congo has fallen far short, through the failings both of the external parties and the Congolese political elite.'
- Professor Crawford Young, University of Wisconsin
'Trefon's sweeping survey of reconstruction efforts in Congo, from bridge repairs to security sector reform, delivers a stinging indictment of both the Congolese government and its international partners, leaving no one unscathed. Sure to create controversy, this book makes for a compelling read and calls for an understanding of Congo and the Congolese on their own terms.'
- Professor Pierre Englebert, Pomona College
'Understanding the Congo -- formerly Zaïre -- is not easy, which explains why we tend easily to think according to clichés, old and new. If we are to move away from Manichean interpretations, including whether the Congo is or is not 'the heart of darkness', we need to rely on scholarship that is at once empirical and sensitive to the historical and cultural context of the country's present condition. Trefon's Congo Masquerade is an important contribution to such scholarship since it asks the right questions about why aid has failed to lead to the required reforms in the country. Focusing on the contemporary period, Trefon explains how state failure can be 'profitable' for those who control it and why the prevalent political culture prevents reform from taking root. Written in simple prose and short chapters, this book will provide a more convincing explanation of what is happening in the Congo than most other books available today. It should be mandatory reading for all those who are concerned with the country or are involved in efforts to reform the state and spur development.'
- Professor Patrick Chabal, Kings College London
'Trefon has written a compelling and well-informed account of the ever unfolding catastrophe that is the Congo; he ably chronicles the mixtures of incompetence, venality, and short-sighted selfish interests on the part of domestic and international actors that have been that country's undoing. This is an excellent introduction to the Congo's complex problems.'
- Dr Nicolas van de Walle, Department of Government, Cornell University
'An impressive piece of work. In 150 pages of concisely analyzed and carefully referenced data, Trefon covers the most salient features of the Congo's 'unending crisis'. There is plenty of blame to be shared, and Trefon evenhandedly identifies the tacit collusion that links the transnational networks of 'aid donors', INGO's, and local NGOs and Congolese actors. The combination of 'development aid' that 'neither aids nor develops with a largely impotent yet arbitrary state apparatus -the legitimacy of which has been in doubt for over fifty years- accounts in large part for the appalling gap between the Congo's potential and its enduring misery. In a nuanced yet compelling way, Trefon argues (as others have done for Liberia and Sierra Leone) for the need to 'put the state back in' and to reform it in such a way as to give it the capacity to deliver public goods. He also points out that, contrary to some Western stereotypes, the Congolese have maintained a genuine sense of national identity which (whether or not it represents a form of 'imagined community') suggests that the Congo is, in some ways, a nation in search of a state, and that 'state-building' may be a more urgent priority than 'nation-building'.'
- Edouard Bustin, Boston University
Monday, 15 August 2011
Kamerhe, Rwanda’s Trojan Horse?
If his success is a concern to Kabila, it is also a reason for Vital Kamerhe to rethink his strategy. It would make more electoral sense for Kamerhe, who has a relatively solid powerbase in theEast (but more in North Kivu than in South Kivu) to lend support to Tshisekedi in exchange for assurances to be appointed Prime Minister. Bemba hasn’t said much about what he thinks about a single opposition candidate, and his position counts (even though he currently sits in an International Criminel Court prison cell).
Though it seems rather far-fetched, some Congolese believe that Kamerhe is Rwanda’s ‘Trojan Horse’. The 'falling out' between Kabila and Kamerhe is seen as part of a Machiavellic scheme to destabilize the opposition. The rift they claim is a trick, master-minded by Paul Kagame who needs Kabila to stay in power so Rwanda can pursue its campaign to Balkanize the Congo.
Tuesday, 9 August 2011
Kinshasa voter frustration
32 million Congolese registered to vote in the operation carried out by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) that recently came to a close. This is up from 25 million during the previous round five years ago. The process was highly politicized and took place despite major technical and logistical obstacles.
The registration situation in Kinshasa, where the population voted massively for Jean-Pierre Bemba in 2005 - and where President Kabila remains unpopular - was analyzed by Guy De Boeck in the Revue Dialogue n° 35. Although the expected figure was 3.5 million, 3.3 million people registered in the capital.
Four categories of problems were identified.
(i) Technical and logistical obstacles included the long distance some people had to walk to reach a registration center (up to 15 km), disorder in queues, delays in processing due to computer breakdowns or the lack of election kits and the issuance of cards that are not conform to standards.
(ii) ‘social’ problems: because electoral agents were not paid, they took excessively long breaks and aggravated the waiting period. They also insisted on people paying for their voter registration cards, which is against the free and fair logic of the process.
(iii) establishing the real identity of voters was a major problem. Police officers served as electoral agents and there was poor communication about voting procedures. Candidates anxious to boost votes in their constituencies bussed people to their voting districts outside of the Kinshasa city limits.
(iv) a host of psychological factors were also reported. People are frustrated by the lack of social and democratic progress since voting five years ago so are discouraged by the electoral process. They believe Bemba won in 2005 but was robbed of his rights. Changing the rules of the game – going from two elections rounds to one – is perceived as a harbinger of fraud and manipulation. There is clear lack of confidence in the CENI.
Kinois do not have high expectations and are largely disillusioned by the electoral process. The CENI probably did not make it particularly easy for registration in Kinshasa given Kabila’s general lack of popularity there. In the probable event of a Kabila victory nationwide, the key question is whether or not they will transform apathy into mobilization. This will be determined largely by the mots d’ordre given by opposition leaders.
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| Jardin Zoologique de Kinshasa |
The registration situation in Kinshasa, where the population voted massively for Jean-Pierre Bemba in 2005 - and where President Kabila remains unpopular - was analyzed by Guy De Boeck in the Revue Dialogue n° 35. Although the expected figure was 3.5 million, 3.3 million people registered in the capital.
Four categories of problems were identified.
(i) Technical and logistical obstacles included the long distance some people had to walk to reach a registration center (up to 15 km), disorder in queues, delays in processing due to computer breakdowns or the lack of election kits and the issuance of cards that are not conform to standards.
(ii) ‘social’ problems: because electoral agents were not paid, they took excessively long breaks and aggravated the waiting period. They also insisted on people paying for their voter registration cards, which is against the free and fair logic of the process.
(iii) establishing the real identity of voters was a major problem. Police officers served as electoral agents and there was poor communication about voting procedures. Candidates anxious to boost votes in their constituencies bussed people to their voting districts outside of the Kinshasa city limits.
(iv) a host of psychological factors were also reported. People are frustrated by the lack of social and democratic progress since voting five years ago so are discouraged by the electoral process. They believe Bemba won in 2005 but was robbed of his rights. Changing the rules of the game – going from two elections rounds to one – is perceived as a harbinger of fraud and manipulation. There is clear lack of confidence in the CENI.
Kinois do not have high expectations and are largely disillusioned by the electoral process. The CENI probably did not make it particularly easy for registration in Kinshasa given Kabila’s general lack of popularity there. In the probable event of a Kabila victory nationwide, the key question is whether or not they will transform apathy into mobilization. This will be determined largely by the mots d’ordre given by opposition leaders.
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