Congo experts will not learn much from this posting which is an email interview I did for World Politics Review. It may however introduce you to an interesting web platform on international relations.
Global Insider: The U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
By The Editors | 18 Jul 2011
In late-June, the U.N. Security Council renewed the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), despite calls by DRC leaders for its withdrawal and fierce criticism of the mission's failure to halt the country's rape crisis. In an email interview, Theodore Trefon, senior researcher at the Royal Museum of Central Africa in Belgium and author of the forthcoming book "Congo Masquerade," discussed the U.N.'s peacekeeping mission in the DRC.
WPR: What are the main challenges facing the U.N. in the DRC?
Theodore Trefon: Powerlessness is the word that best captures the challenges facing the U.N. in this Western Europe-sized country of 70 million people. Congo is a fragile state with overwhelming macroeconomic, security and governance troubles. The territory is fragmented, with no real central government. Those in power lack political expertise and tend to be driven more by personal gain than the common good.
After decades of dictatorship, state collapse and war, both the state and society need to be rebuilt. Public health, education, infrastructure, security, the economy and establishing trust between government and people are all priorities. But the U.N. has neither the financial means nor the conceptual or operational capacity to deal with these fundamentals in a coherent way.
There is no master plan to piece the country back together. The reconstruction agenda is a series of isolated actions by partners with diverging perceptions and objectives. This is exacerbated by the fact that Congolese authorities see their sovereignty undermined by the U.N., and so have not accepted the relevance of the imported state-building agendas.
WPR: What successes has the U.N. Mission in the DRC achieved?
Trefon: It makes more sense to start with failures. The U.N. Mission in the DRC (MONUC), as it was originally called, is powerless to protect civilian lives. It has been accused of sexual abuse of children, gold and diamond smuggling, arms trading and running away from rebels. It has formal links with the national army, which is the major perpetrator of human rights abuses.
Nonetheless, the mission can claim some tenuous achievements. It participated in peace building and the transition toward democratic rule by overseeing the Lusaka Agreement and the Sun City national dialogue. It provided logistical support for the 2006 elections and helps coordinate humanitarian aid while monitoring human rights abuses. MONUC has monitored cease-fires between foreign and Congolese forces, brokered local truces between rival groups in the Kivu provinces and disarmed and repatriated thousands of foreign combatants.
The mission's aviation sector plays a major role in reuniting the country through the transportation of goods -- electoral kits for example -- and people. Its Radio Okapi is one of the best sources of nonpartisan information.
WPR: How have the mission's objectives changed over the course of the mission, and what impact will the recent one-year extension have?
Trefon: There has been a shift from a military approach toward a political one. The mission's military strategy was justified in the early years because of the illegal exploitation of natural resources, institutional weaknesses, ethnic rivalries, land disputes, the perpetration of human rights violations and the presence of heavily armed rebel groups.
The world's largest U.N. mission had 20,573 uniformed personnel in early 2010. But 2,000 troops withdrew in July 2010, and the operation was rebaptized the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in in the DRC (MONUSCO). "Stabilization" implies development work and political support, along with the ongoing priority of preparing for this year's presidential and legislative elections.
Withdrawal will not be easy. By staying, MONUSCO continues to artificially replace the state, perpetuating dependency. When it leaves, a security vacuum could result with the likelihood of renewed armed conflict.
Tuesday, 19 July 2011
Monday, 4 July 2011
Urban and peri-urban agriculture, credit, fuel, food and hunger
The Congolese are amonst the hungriest people in the world. The urban poor are particularly hard hit. A $10.4 million FAO programme was consequently set up in five large cities to fight against malnutrition. It has increased daily intake of greens, tomatoes, potatoes, carrots and other vegetables.
Farmers have seen their incomes increase dramatically. In Kinshasa and Lubumbashi for example, annual income of each farmer has increased from around $500 in 2004 to $2,000 in 2010. In Likasi it rose from $700 to $3,500. There have been similar increases in other cities.
The programme has also created jobs, providing work and income for 16,000 small-scale market gardeners and more than 60,000 people that form the links in the horticulture chain from field to table.
Peri-urban farm plot - Maluku |
Congo Masquerade is a critique of how reform initiatives and development projects have done little to help ordinary Congolese improve their well-being. Despite the book’s harsh assessment, I agree of course that there are numerous counter examples – in other words, real Congolese sucess stories. Agriculture is a good example of how positive change is emerging thanks to peoples' committment, adaptability and creativity. Agriculture is also the sector par excellence that highlights the interconnectivity of wide ranging development priorities.
The Congolese are amonst the hungriest people in the world. The urban poor are particularly hard hit. A $10.4 million FAO programme was consequently set up in five large cities to fight against malnutrition. It has increased daily intake of greens, tomatoes, potatoes, carrots and other vegetables.
Farmers have seen their incomes increase dramatically. In Kinshasa and Lubumbashi for example, annual income of each farmer has increased from around $500 in 2004 to $2,000 in 2010. In Likasi it rose from $700 to $3,500. There have been similar increases in other cities.
The programme has also created jobs, providing work and income for 16,000 small-scale market gardeners and more than 60,000 people that form the links in the horticulture chain from field to table.
The first thing FAO did was to put in place institutional structures to link FAO, government and local authorities with horticulturists and farmers’ groups. It supplied seeds for new food varieties and invested in repairing irrigation infrastructure which had a side benefit of providing safe and clean water for the communities. The programme also introduced Integrated Production and Protection Management to help reduce reliance on synthetic pesticides.
Improved food security initiatives have also been supported by the Alliance Agricongo. The NGO platform has documented grassroots efforts in a beautifully illustrated book, highlighting the realities of what can be accomplished despite overwhelming challenges. The book provides powerful testimony to the ability of people – mainly women - to get things accomplished at their own micro-levels.
Intiatives to transform the urban unemployed into productive urban and peri-urban farmers have benefited significantly from greater farmer accessibility to micro-finace schemes. The FAO programme has been supported by FINCA which provides group loans to over 11,000 poor clients in urban and rural DRC.
Cell phone availability and food production is an important but understudied phenonemon. In a country with practically no landlines, cell phones contribute to improving the efficacy of food trade networks. Urban buyers can place orders directly with rural or peri-urban cooperatives, transporters share information about road conditions (and security/administrative hassles) and credit based on social capital and trust can be arranged thanks to direct communication without going through intermediaries. This also has an impact on establishing prices.
Peri-urban farming is a concern that needs to be analysed in close conjunction with peri-urban charcoal production. Food production and consumption and access to makala in and around Congo's big cities are also interconnected priorities.
Cell phone availability and food production is an important but understudied phenonemon. In a country with practically no landlines, cell phones contribute to improving the efficacy of food trade networks. Urban buyers can place orders directly with rural or peri-urban cooperatives, transporters share information about road conditions (and security/administrative hassles) and credit based on social capital and trust can be arranged thanks to direct communication without going through intermediaries. This also has an impact on establishing prices.
Peri-urban charcoal traders |
Labels:
agriculture,
cell phones,
charcoal,
food security,
makala,
micro-credit
Monday, 20 June 2011
Kinshasa vigilante whistle-blowers
This is a random story about agency in Kinshasa – the way ordinary people organize to cope with state failure – in this case the absence of local police. A friend told me about how his neighbourhood in Limete was increasingly subjected to house breaks and low-intensity violence.
“Fed up, with burglaries and problems of insecurity, we decided to take things into our own hands. We have no police here. Discussions took place in the comités de quartier. We decided to form a task force to propose solutions to prevent further instances. We wanted to protect ourselves and our belongings while being humane at the same time. We came up with an idea and everyone pitched in to buy what was needed. We made a group purchase, followed by distribution to every household. Instructions were given. In case of an incident – everyone would be mobilized…”
After the Rwandan massacres, you can probably guess what I imagined. But there were no machetes here.
My friend continued: “In case of an incident, we would take our new whistles and blow as loud as possible, alerting the neighbourhood and scaring off the intruders.”
This seems to be a good lesson in humility and creativity, a popular response to a real problem that the government hasn’t been able to address.
whistle-blower |
“Fed up, with burglaries and problems of insecurity, we decided to take things into our own hands. We have no police here. Discussions took place in the comités de quartier. We decided to form a task force to propose solutions to prevent further instances. We wanted to protect ourselves and our belongings while being humane at the same time. We came up with an idea and everyone pitched in to buy what was needed. We made a group purchase, followed by distribution to every household. Instructions were given. In case of an incident – everyone would be mobilized…”
After the Rwandan massacres, you can probably guess what I imagined. But there were no machetes here.
My friend continued: “In case of an incident, we would take our new whistles and blow as loud as possible, alerting the neighbourhood and scaring off the intruders.”
This seems to be a good lesson in humility and creativity, a popular response to a real problem that the government hasn’t been able to address.
Monday, 13 June 2011
Tshisekedi banned - journalist harrassed
Congolese journalist Serge Bitangilayi was detained and intimidated by officers of the notorious Agence nationale des renseignements (ANR) in Mbuji-Mayi this week. His crime? Broadcasting images of UDPS leader Etienne Tshisekedi. Kasai provincial authorities banned broadcasts of the veteran opposition heavyweight who will compete with Kabila for the presidency later this year.
Harassment of media professionals is ongoing proof of how factions in the Kabila government are strangling freedom of expression in the run up to elections.
The incident was condemned by Observatoire de la Liberté de la Presse en Afrique (OLPA) and by Journaliste en Danger (JED).
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Etienne Tshisekedi |
Harassment of media professionals is ongoing proof of how factions in the Kabila government are strangling freedom of expression in the run up to elections.
The incident was condemned by Observatoire de la Liberté de la Presse en Afrique (OLPA) and by Journaliste en Danger (JED).
Wednesday, 8 June 2011
Mickey au Congo
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@Walt Disney Co. |
En novembre 2009 Disney s’est déclaré prêt à investir 4 milliards de dollars dans le mécanisme REDD en RDC et au Pérou en collaboration avec l’ONG américaine, Conservation International. La Réserve des Gorilles de Tayna est le site en RDC identifié pour les efforts Disney. Il s’agit d’appuyer les communautés locales à mieux gérer leurs forets, à améliorer leurs conditions de vie et à mener les études afin d’accompagner le pays dans le processus REDD.
Je n’ai pas trouvé d’informations récentes sur le travail de Disney dans la Réserve de Tayna. Si vous en avez, merci de bien vouloir les partager.
Friday, 3 June 2011
Natural resources transparency decree
Global Witness has rightly welcomed the publishing of a ministerial decree requiring the disclosure of contract information relating to oil, mining and forestry. Signed on 20 May, the decree could be considered as a useful step in enabling Congo’s fragile civil society to presure government for more transparency in what has so far been a realm of shady deal-making.
The Global Witness press release also emphasizes the need to ensure that the decree is correctly implemented. This is the real challenge. Le Potentiel of 5 June comments that: ‘Des clauses contractuelles secrètes ... peuvent être envisagées et les moyens d’évasion fiscale sont si sophistiqués que même un gouvernement, fortement déterminé, a du mal à éradiquer la corruption’.
Given the high economic stakes, it is illusory to think that officials in high places will not be able to circumvent the terms of the new decree. The non-respect of the December 2005 presidential decree about forestry could be an indication. The secrecy surrounding the Congo-China six billion dollar barter deal is another example of Congolese non-transparency.
The Global Witness press release also emphasizes the need to ensure that the decree is correctly implemented. This is the real challenge. Le Potentiel of 5 June comments that: ‘Des clauses contractuelles secrètes ... peuvent être envisagées et les moyens d’évasion fiscale sont si sophistiqués que même un gouvernement, fortement déterminé, a du mal à éradiquer la corruption’.
Given the high economic stakes, it is illusory to think that officials in high places will not be able to circumvent the terms of the new decree. The non-respect of the December 2005 presidential decree about forestry could be an indication. The secrecy surrounding the Congo-China six billion dollar barter deal is another example of Congolese non-transparency.
Thursday, 2 June 2011
Triste anniversaire: Floribert Chebeya
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MURDERED |
Monoko ya mokonzi ezali mobeko. Oboyi kotusa monoko ya mokonzi, obuki mobeko ya leta.
Le président de la Voix des sans voix, avait été retrouvé mort le 2 juin 2010. Daniel Mukalay, chef des services spéciaux de la police, avait avoué avoir participé, comme exécutant, au meurtre du président de l'ONG. Il risque la peine capitale. Mais il y un grand absent devant la justice : le patron de la police congolaise, le général John Numbi, mis en cause par Mukalay.
Un an après l'assassinat du défenseur des droits de l'homme congolais, le procès des assassins présumés touche à sa fin. Le verdict devrait être rendu dans trois semaines...
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